Examining Indonesian Corruption Through the Leadership Lenses

Karaniya Dharmasaputra
Dept. of Political Science, the Ohio State University
Autumn, December 6, 2006

William Liddle offers an alternative framework of what he terms leadership or individual actor approach to explain and analyze socio-political phenomena. This approach differs from the prevailing frameworks in political science. The cultural approach, for instance, views that political actor’s behavior is shaped by belief and norm system. The other is structural framework. This argues that institution determines political dynamics and constrains actor’s choices. Personality is the third paradigm that places psychology at the center of analysis. According to this, psychological processes construct individual characteristics, cognitions, motivation and personality. These attitudinal factors, in turn, shape political actor’s behaviors and decision making processess. The last one is the rationality approach. This theorem sees political actors as a rational individual who always try to maximize their best interest. Thus, according to this framework, politics is a rational-benefit maximizing game.

In contrast to those, Liddle’s novel approach focuses on “individual political leaders in making choices to build and maintain support in varying situations of constraint and opportunity” (1996, 7). The main concept focuses its attention on the actions of individual agent that in Liddle’s view has long been ignored by structuralists. Political actor, in this framework, is able to make autonomous and consequential decisions and actions. Constrained by structure, shaped by culture, and bounded in the context of time, agent can formulate tactics and mobilize resources to make changes.

It is important to note Liddle’s emphasis that this approach is not meant to deny the impact of the four existing frameworks on political behaviors. In his view, virtu is the mediator of fortuna, leadership is “an intervening variable between structure and culture,” and thus the role of political actor is highly significant as well (Liddle 1996, 11). In my opinion, the individual actor approach offers benefits in explaining social phenomena and designing reforms. On the followings, I will try to show them, one by one, by examining Indonesian corruption as the study case.

First, the explanatory power of the leadership theorem. Using the traditional approaches in finding a remedy for Indonesian corruption, one would end at a cul-de-sac. In the country that is currently placed by the Transparency International index as the tenth most corrupt state in the world, analysts have long concluded that corruption have been being systemized and institutionalized; from the high rank bureaucrats to the low level officials, from the palace to the village. Fraudulent practices contaminate all institutions. Unlike Hong Kong, Malaysia, or South Korea where the anti corruption campaigns can rely on the integrity of highly professional legal apparatus, Indonesian judiciary system even functions as one of the major sources of extortion. In brief, institutionally, Indonesia is hopeless.

The rationality approach does not offer a brighter view, either. The common argument of this framework is that the high level of corruption is an expected result of the low civil servants’ salary and the low risk in corruption detection. So, the answer offered to addressing corruption is pretty straight forward: to raise the remuneration and to increase the cost of corruption. Unfortunately, these advices can not be further from the truth.

Those factors closely relate to the structural obstacles. Indonesian economy is still crawling and the resource for wage increase is limited. Moreover, empirical evidence has shown us that this sole factor does not guarantee corruption reduction. Even though applying high remuneration on a head-to-head level with that in private corporations, BPPN (the Indonesian bank restructuring agency) and BI (the central bank) still suffer corruption severely. As well, raising the sanction side is heavily constrained by the current high level corruption in the judiciary system. And, last but not least, the deep institutionalized corruption forces civil servants to be involved in this illicit practice to survive their careers and even just to get their jobs done. So, like the structuralist approach, we see the inadequacy of the rationality framework.

How about the cultural paradigm? It leads us to the same frustration. This approach argues, for instance, that Indonesians perceive corruption permissively due to the culture. It is not uncommon we heard an argument that asking and receiving money as a gift is a part of certain, even religious, traditions. Others view that, in line with the phenomenon of the institutionalized corruption, corruption embodies and forms its roots in the culture. However, here we are again dissatisfied in suddenly seeing a very wide variation. We, for example, immediately see a contrast between two infamous NU kyais, Nur Iskandar S.Q. and Mustofa Bisri. They are both ulamas and were raised in the NU pesantren culture, but why do they behave very differently in regard corruption?

And without needed to discuss any longer we also see the weak explanatory power of personality approach. If various personalities result in a similar drive to be involved in corruption, thus we see the inadequacy of this approach. And due to these inabilities, it is not surprising that the cultural and personality frameworks would not satisfy our need to find a panacea for examining Indonesian corruption.

In such analytical dead-end, I see the potential of Liddle’s virtu approach. Autonomous political leaders, no matter his cultural and personality background, could make autonomous and consequential breakthrough on the institutional and rational choice cul-de-sac. And the results of such decision and action might in turn shaping structure and reward system toward good governance. To make the point clearer, consider the following empirical evidence.

Right after Suharto fell in 1998 almost every prominent actors of reformasi cried the importance of anti-corruption war. Held in the same year, the Special Assembly of People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) passed the Decree No. 11 on Good Governance and Anti-Corruption. A year later, the House of Representatives passed the powerful Anti Corruption Law and in 2002 established the independent Corruption Eradication Commission. We see the structural changes here.

The political liberalization also brings the constituency’s demand on a firm anti corruption campaign to the fore of national political stage. A nation-wide survey conducted by the Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia (PGRI) in December 2001 found that nearly 70 percent of respondents perceived corruption as a serious problem, as “a disease to combat.” Assuming that political actors are rational, here we view a change in the political reward system by waging anti-corruption issue.

Culturally, except the recent rigorous campaign initiated by KPK, I see no substantial changes. At this point I also omit the personality factor since it offers a little relevance to our discussion.

During this period of change in regard the anti-corruption issue (from 1998 to present), Indonesia have four presidents, B.J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati Sukarnoputri, and now Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The question is why only Yudhoyono who chose anti-corruption as his major campaign theme and then, after elected, he firmly decides and rigorously pursues anti-corruption drives? Why did not Habibie, Abdurrahman, or Megawati take the same route? As shown above, the anti corruption institutions and huge demand for anti corruption campaign have been established and presented when they all took the office. That is not an available option for Yudhoyono only.

We also question the efficacy of the culturalist and personality framework in explainin this phenomenon. The culture of corruption among Indonesians, I would argue, has not changed significantly. I can also hardly find a sound reason to judge the significant role of Yudhoyono’s personality on the back of his decision in launching a firm anti-corruption campaign. Nor can I apply the method of difference to rule out his predecessors’ psyche for not doing so. The point is if culture and personality remains constant, why we are now seeing a change in the anti-corruption campaign? Why during Yudhoyono’s administration? Why not before?

At this point, I see the usefulness of leadership as a method of analysis. The aforementioned phenomenon provides a proof of how the role of individual political leader does matter. Through the lenses of virtu we clearly see of how the change in anti-corruption drives is pushed and molded at the first place not by the institution, rationality, culture, or personality, but by autonomous and consequential President Yudhoyono’s decisions and acts.

I speculate one of the major reasons behind such Yudhoyono’s decision resorting to a constraint he faces. Supporting by a weak Democratic Party, Yudhoyono’s political position is vulnerable. Anti-corruption measures, on the other hand, offer a plenty resources and coercive means to balance out his political weakness. A further systematic study is needed to check the merit of this speculation. Yet, if such wild guess is proven, we see how the role of leaders in employing tactics and resource can change the constraint factors he has to deal with.

My second point, the leadership approach acquire us to change our priority in designing the Indonesian reform and might explain the reason behind the recent slow-paced progress. In my view, the efforts to reconstruct a new Indonesia are heavily relied on the structuralist and the rationality approach. New laws, institutions, and reward system alteration has been introduced and established. We can easily enlist them, as I have shown some of them in the anti-corruption field. However, I would argue, the result is not entirely satisfactory.

Liddle’s leaderaship offers a base to question whether the source of the problem is the failure of the reformer to put the importance of agency’s role at their top priority. Here, I question the inadequacy of today’s recruitment system in placing and encouraging individuals with high integrity and professional skills to take over the rein of the country. This reminds us to a dramatic breakthrough in recruiting the non-career supreme judges. Though the net impact is debatable, the public sees how Artidjo Alkotsar and Abdul Rahman Saleh have courageously dissented from their colleagues in numerous high-profile corruption cases. We are also aware of the important role of two current KPK’s commissioners, Erry Riyana Hardjapamekas and Amien Sunaryadi. Unlike three other commissioners who are former police official, prosecutor and auditor; Erry and Amien were also the founders of a respected anti corruption NGO, the Indonesian Transparent Society (MTI).

However, a note must be underlined. As we have seen above, the role of individual actor is eventually relied back on the recruitment system. Thus, at this point, it seems that we should start the reform on the institutional level that has been shown above does not offer a satisfactory solution. A further study might be needed to examine the emergence of social forces and critical junctures that had opened window opportunity for the entrance of leadership variable. Comparing Indonesian and Korean reform, Liddle in this regard points out the important impact of “pressure from below.”

Kim, Liddle, and Said write that virtu “is the skill of the human agents who shape and are shaped by structure” (n.d., 2). As well, this notion also demands a more detail investigation to answer the question that in a failed system what factors could induce the recruitment of skillful agent who is in turn capable to transform the institution to the one with a better quality?

The leadership framework needs to address this puzzle to round off its efficacy.

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