DPR with Integrity, How Possible?

Published at Tempo Daily Newspaper, August 27, 2007

By: Karaniya Dharmasaputra
Research Associate of Transparency International Indonesia

Countries’ experiences have shown that parliament, in fact, could be an alternative in taking pivotal role in combating corruption. This potential, however, is frequently ignored. As we have been seeing in this country, efforts to promote good-governance have been being focused merely on two government branches, the executive and judicative. The reform has not touched the chronic corruption within the parliament.

Theoretically, in a democracy, parliament is an institution where citizens could hang upon their interests of good governance. This relates to the four key roles of legislator, namely to pass laws to control corruption (legislation function), to make sure that government undertakes its authorities with accountability (oversight function), to protect his/her constituents’ interest from the adverse impact of corruption (representation function), and not less important, to create and maintain political-will to fight this illegal and harmful practice.

These strategic positions have been displayed in countries that even belong to the list of the most-corrupt ones in the world. Kenya and Uganda are the two examples.

The Goldenberg Scandal—the 24 trillion shilling embezzlement in the Kenyan Central Bank and the largest corruption case in the Sub-Saharan Africa history—was firstly revealed by two Kenyan members of parliament from the opposition party. Besides, war on corruption in this country cannot be detached from the significant role of the Kombo Commission, the anti-corruption commission in LEGCO (Legislative Council of Kenya) that are named after its highly respected chairman, Musikari Kombo. In 1975, Legislator J.M. Kariuki was even murdered because of his persistent effort to unfold corruption within the government (Matiangi 2006).

As well, Uganda’s history notes the pivotal role of their MPs. Working hand in hand with the press and NGOs, they disclosed the corruption scandals of two powerful ministers, Minister of Basic Education Brigadier General Jim K. Muhwezi and Minister of Finance Sam Kutesa, and then successfully forced them to step down (Smith 2006).

Unfortunately, DPR-RI is not the LEGCO. Instead of being seen as a promising solution, Indonesians perceive their legislators as a source of these illicit practices. The 2006 Global Corruption Barometer of Transparency International Indonesia concluded that majority of the respondents place the legislative as the most corrupt institution in the country. Press has also frequently reported of how bribery and extortion have badly distorted our legislation processes.

But we may never surrender our hope. At least, there are three opportunities that can be explored to formulate any future reforms.

First, any of those currently creeping in the darkness under the DPR benches must be placed on the spotlight. One of the most crucial recommendations is to design the legislation processes as transparent as possible. Now, since the public information system is not available, we can never recognize who MPs supporting or opposing certain clauses in a bill formulation process.

The consensus method that prevails in the current legislation process must be altered to the open-vote system. The lobbying mechanism that is running under the table must be lifted to the transparent-surface by regulating that as what have been done in the United States through the Lobbying Act. From there, we may hope there will be a more concrete reward and punishment mechanism between the legislatures and their constituents.

The second chance emerges from the concept of “multiple veto points”—the distribution of legislation powers onto various centrums. In the American federal government system, for example, Senate, the House of Representatives, and President, share authorities in passing or blocking a bill that makes none of them is able to monopolize. Susan Rose-Ackerman (1999), a professor in law and politics at Yale University, U.S., argues that such system—beside its negative sides e.g. pro status-quo bias—tends to make corruption in the legislation processes becomes so expensive and risky, and at the end, minimizes level of corruption.

In our country, this phenomenon we see through the emergence of the Constitution Court (MK) as an alternative to challenge the DPR’s legislation product (in relation to the Constitution). In this regard, the idea to expanding the Regional Representatives Council’s (DPD) authority is important to support. If we are able to mold DPD as an institution like the U.S. Senate, for instance, DPD potentially becomes a balancing power to DPR that is currently very dominant and corrupt. As a result, the economic law of corruption, we hope, starts talking: competition up, bribery-cost down.

The third possibility to explore is providing support and international network for the MPs who are committed in combating corruption. I believe that such group of MPs does exist, albeit the number is relatively small. One of the networks to be considered is the Global Organization of Parliamentarians against Corruption (GOPAC). Declared in Ottawa, Canada, in 2002, GOPAC is a global web of MPs that provides information, tools, trainings, advocacy, and other efforts in supporting its members in fighting corruption. Engaging the legislatures who has integrity in this network, could increase the incentive, motivation, and technical skills of those MPs to start fighting corruption and cleaning up the DPR itself.

We have long been queasy in watching how our legislators are ethics-blinded. Therefore, the demand to reform our parliament must be pushed immediately.