Menagih Pembaharuan MA

Tajuk - Koran Tempo, 21 Desember 2007
Oleh: Karaniya Dharmasaputra

Figur sekelas Profesor Bagir Manan--seorang akademisi dan hakim nonkarir--ternyata bukan garansi bagi terwujudnya sebuah Mahkamah Agung (MA) yang menjunjung cita-cita reformasi. Setelah Orde Baru tumbang dan MA memperoleh independensinya, kita menyaksikan lembaga peradilan tertinggi ini masih menjadi institusi yang tertutup dan tak akuntabel.

Tengok saja kabar tentang MA yang mendominasi halaman muka berbagai koran beberapa hari belakangan.

Kita telah lama prihatin menyaksikan banyak instansi pemerintah mengelola rekening liar yang tak jelas pertanggungjawabannya. Karena itulah, kita menyambut gembira ketika Departemen Keuangan membentuk Tim Penertiban Rekening untuk membereskannya. Senin kemarin, Tim mengumumkan telah menemukan kejanggalan pada 1.700-an rekening dengan nilai total Rp 1 triliun lebih.

Ternyata, hasil itu belum meliputi rekening MA. Lembaga yang (konon) merupakan benteng terakhir keadilan ini, merupakan satu-satunya instansi yang belum bisa dijangkau Tim Pembenahan. Menurut Departemen Keuangan, pejabat MA tak sekalipun menggubris undangan untuk membahas persoalan penting ini. MA baru sebatas mengirimkan data, dan karena itu rekeningnya belum dapat ditelisik.

Ini amat kami sesalkan, karena rekening di lingkungan MA bukan tanpa masalah. Sebagaimana diakui sendiri oleh pihak MA, ada ratusan rekening milik berbagai pengadilan di Bank Mandiri yang tak jelas hal-ihwalnya.

Keprihatinan kami makin menjadi, mengingat ketertutupan ini bukan baru kali pertama. Sebelumnya, MA juga sempat menutup pintu rapat-rapat terhadap niat Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan (BPK) untuk mengaudit biaya perkara yang dikelolanya. Agustus lalu, BPK mengungkap adanya pungutan terhadap pihak berperkara sebesar Rp 500 ribu di tingkat kasasi dan Rp 2,5 juta untuk peninjauan kembali. Dari jumlah itu, auditor mendapati yang disetor ke kas negara cuma seribu perak per perkara. Ke mana dan bagaimana selebihnya uang itu dikelola, hanya pimpinan MA yang tahu.

Transparansi dan akuntabilitas pengelolaan keuangan pemerintah, telah kita sepakati merupakan salah satu tonggak terpenting reformasi. Alih-alih menjadi halang-rintang yang utama, MA semestinya menjadi gantungan harapan kita semua dalam mewujudkan cita-cita itu.

Perlu kami ingatkan di sini, soal transparansi dan akuntabilitas itu telah tebal-tebal digarisbawahi dalam Cetak Biru Pembaharuan MA. Dirampungkan 2003 lalu, dalam kata pengantarnya Bagir menulis bahwa dokumen ini "merupakan sebuah pedoman/arah dan pendekatan yang akan ditempuh oleh MA untuk mengembalikan citra MA sebagai lembaga yang terhormat dan dihormati masyarakat dan Lembaga Negara lainnya."

Bahkan, menyangkut uang perkara di atas, Cetak Biru telah secara khusus memberikan rekomendasi gamblang. Bunyinya: "MA perlu memberikan kesempatan kepada BPK untuk dapat memeriksa uang perkara yang dikelola MA."

Suatu saat Bagir pernah dengan bungah menyatakan, "Saya lah yang memelopori transparansi di lingkungan pengadilan." Dengan segala hormat, kami mendesak Ketua MA supaya berpegang teguh pada apa yang pernah dinyatakannya sendiri.

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Menyorot Seleksi Pimpinan KPK

Tajuk – Koran Tempo, 7 Desember 2007
Oleh: Karaniya Dharmasaputra

Sungguh mengecewakan hasil seleksi pimpinan Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK) 2007-2011. Dua hari lalu, wakil rakyat di Komisi Hukum menulikan diri dari tuntutan khalayak dengan kukuh memilih jaksa Antasari Azhar sebagai ketua baru KPK—lembaga tumpuan harapan kita untuk mewujudkan Indonesia yang lebih bersih.

Sejak awal, proses seleksi Antasari telah menuai kritik. Rekam jejak Direktur Penuntutan Kejaksaan Agung ini dinodai paling banyak laporan negatif. Kepada Komisi Pemantau Peradilan, sejumlah pengacara, pengusaha, politisi, dan wartawan menuding Antasari pernah terlibat pemerasan dan penyuapan. Laporan kekayaannya pun disorot. Menerima gaji Rp 5,5 juta sebulan, ia mengaku berharta Rp 3,5 miliar. September lalu, usai diwawancarai ihwal pencalonannya, sang ketua KPK terpilih menawari /Tempo/ apa yang disebutnya “uang terima kasih” berbentuk lembaran dolar Amerika.

Blunder ini tak lepas dari peran Panitia Seleksi yang ditunjuk Presiden Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono untuk menyaring 10 nama calon, sebelum kemudian disodorkan ke parlemen. Meski telah menerima berbagai catatan di atas, Panitia Seleksi yang sejatinya punya kewenangan penuh untuk mencoret nama kandidat yang diragukan integritasnya, memilih tetap meloloskannya. Ini amat disayangkan, mengingat Panitia Seleksi beranggotakan sejumlah “nama besar” yang diagung-agungkan publik. Mereka antara lain: Menteri Pendayagunaan Aparatur Negara Taufik Effendi, Adi Andoyo, Syafii Maarif, Felia Salim, Daniel Sparringa, Rhenald Kasali, Komaruddin Hidayat, Ichlasul Amal, Hikmahanto Juwana, dan Fajrul Falaakh.

Metode seleksi ini harus tajam dievaluasi dan diperbaiki. Satu hal yang patut kita pertanyakan adalah kontradiksi di balik mekanisme yang kini berlaku. DPR adalah salah satu lembaga paling korup di negeri ini, tapi DPR itu juga lah yang diberi mandat untuk memilih pemimpin komisi antikorupsi.

Selama ini parlemen tak henti dirundung skandal—mulai dari kasus dana nonbujeter Departemen Kelautan dan Perikanan sampai aliran duit Bank Indonesia; dan KPK lah yang gencar mengusutnya. Kepada koran ini, Wakil Ketua KPK sekarang, Amien Sunaryadi, pernah mengutarakan cita-citanya untuk memenjarakan para koruptor di Senayan, dan Dewan langsung menebas peluangnya untuk melanjutkan tugas di periode mendatang. Tak dibutuhkan seorang Albert Einstein untuk menyimpulkan bahwa politisi kita memang berkepentingan secara langsung untuk mengerdilkan KPK.

Untuk itu, perlu kiranya ditimbang berbagai alternatif lain. Salah satunya adalah seperti yang diterapkan Komisi Independen Antikorupsi Hongkong (ICAC). Berbeda dengan KPK, struktur ICAC didesain agar sesteril mungkin dari kontaminasi kepentingan politik parlemen.

Meski demikian, dunia belumlah kiamat. Kaum reformis, aktivis gerakan antikorupsi, pers, dan tokoh masyarakat madani lainnya perlu segera merapatkan barisan. Langkah bersama penting segera dirumuskan untuk mengantisipasi gejala yang kini dikhawatirkan mengarah pada penggembosan KPK. Walau kita masih harus melihat kinerja pemimpin KPK mendatang, ada baiknya kita juga mulai mencari peluang perbaikan di tempat-tempat lain.

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Menggugat Monopoli

Tajuk – Koran Tempo, 30 Nov 2007
Oleh: Karaniya Dharmasaputra

Berita gugatan class action terhadap Telkomsel dan Indosat adalah hal yang, meminjam motto Majalah Tempo, “enak dibaca dan perlu.” Akhir Oktober lalu, Mikha Melviana dan sejumlah orang lainnya mendaftarkan gugatan terhadap dua perusahaan telepon seluler itu di Pengadilan Negeri Bekasi. Para penggugat menyoal peran kedua operator itu pada mahalnya tarif seluler di negeri ini. Menurut kabar, gugatan serupa akan dilakukan secara bergelombang di kota-kota lain, antara lain Surabaya, Medan, dan Makassar.

Dominasi Telkomsel dan Indosat memang tak terbantahkan. Keduanya menguasai lebih dari 80 persen pangsa pasar seluler di Tanah Air dan diyakini menjadi biang keladi di balik tingginya harga. Penelitian berskala global oleh Morgan Stanley menunjukkan tarif rata-rata per menit jasa seluler Indonesia cuma lebih murah dibanding Australia. Data Direktorat Jenderal Pos dan Telekomunikasi pun memperlihatkan tarif seluler intraoperator kita pada waktu-puncak termasuk paling tinggi di Asia.

Namun demikian, perlu digarisbawahi bahwa sokongan kami terhadap gugatan class action tersebut tak memupuskan kritik terhadap keputusan Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha terbaru. Lebih dari Temasek, menurut hemat kami, adalah pemerintah sebagai pemegang saham mayoritas di Telkomsel dan Indosat yang patut dimintai tanggung jawabnya atas karakter pasar seluler kita yang oligopolistis. Adalah pemerintah sendiri yang menawarkan dan menjual saham Telkomsel dan Indosat ke dua anak perusahaan Temasek, SingTel dan STT, dua tahun setelah UU Antimonopoli disahkan. Terlebih lagi, di balik perkara ini, kami mencium bau sangit yang meruap dari vested interests kelompok bisnis dan politik tertentu. Kami berharap, gugatan class action Mikha cs. tak bertemali dengan berbagai kepentingan terselubung di atas.

Di mata kami, gugatan class action itu membuka jalan ke arah tegaknya hak-hak konsumen—yang telah sekian lama tak berdaya di bawah kungkungan praktek monopoli—di sektor-sektor yang berkait dengan hajat hidup orang banyak. Selama ini, meski telah membayar mahal dan menikmati layanan di bawah standar, kita paling hanya bisa menggerutu saat saluran telepon Telkom putus atau mendapati air PAM yang bau. Beroleh layanan “byar-pet” khas PLN, kita hanya kuasa menyulut lilin sembari bersungut-sungut. Padahal, menurut catatan Yayasan Lembaga Konsumen Indonesia, di tahun 2005 tarif dasar listrik di negeri ini masuk kategori kedua tertinggi di wilayah ASEAN, setelah Filipina.

Sebagaimana kita telah mahfum, monopoli cenderung merugikan konsumen. Ia mendistorsi pasar, membubungkan harga dan memerosotkan kualitas layanan. Karena itulah, peran pemerintah untuk mendobraknya menjadi penting. Di Amerika Serikat, misalnya, pada 1996 Kongres menghantam monopoli Bell dengan mengesahkan UU Telekomunikasi yang baru. Bell dipaksa membuka jaringan mereka supaya bisa diakses operator-operator lokal. Hasilnya, tarif telepon, termasuk seluler, di Negeri Paman Sam turun secara signifikan.

Karena itulah, tak hanya menyangkut tarif seluler, kami mendorong agar tuntutan perlindungan dan pemenuhan hak konsumen juga penting didesakkan di sektor-sektor lain. Pasar listrik, air bersih, dan layanan publik lainnya perlu diliberalisasi. Sedapat mungkin, dengan ikut menimbang daya beli kelompok yang tak mampu, praktek monopoli mesti terus dibongkar dan kompetisi makin digairahkan.


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Kartu Tol Elektronik: Terobosan atau Beban?

Tajuk – Koran Tempo, 10 November 2007

Baru saja protes kenaikan tarif tol surut, kini meruap masalah baru. Soalnya kini di seputar tender proyek pengembangan sistem pembayaran tol elektronis (electronic toll collection, ETC) PT Jasa Marga dengan menggunakan teknologi Contactless Smart Card. Senin lalu, Menteri Negara Urusan Badan Usaha Milik Negara Sofyan Djalil meminta supaya proyek ini ditender ulang. Pasalnya, ia menolak pembebanan biaya administrasi kartu prabayar ini, sebesar 5 persen dari nilai pembayaran tol, kepada masyarakat pengguna. Jasa Marga lah, kata Menteri Sofyan, yang harus menanggung biaya itu.

Kami tentu bersuka cita dengan terobosan ini. Penerapan ETC adalah langkah maju dalam pengelolaan jalan tol di tanah air. Diawali di Bergen, Norwegia pada 1986 silam, sistem ini telah diaplikasikan di banyak negara maju maupun berkembang seperti Filipina dan Brasil.

Sistem ini menawarkan solusi bagi satu persoalan menjengkelkan: kemacetan di ruas tol, yang salah satunya diakibatkan penyumbatan di gerbang pembayaran. Dengan teknologi ETC, biaya tol didebit otomatis saat kendaraan melaju melewati gerbang, sehingga waktu transaksi bisa dipangkas menjadi kurang dari dua detik. Ini jauh lebih cepat dibanding waktu minimum tujuh detik yang diperlukan jika pengendara membayar dengan uang pas. Manfaat lain, sistem ETC juga mengurangi resiko kebocoran pendapatan Jasa Marga akibat tipu-muslihat penjaga gerbang tol.

Yang mengusik kami adalah soal tambahan 5 persen biaya administrasi itu. Beban yang akan ditimpakannya ke pundak konsumen tidaklah sedikit. Coba kita hitung.

Proyek ini akan diterapkan di dua jalur: Cawang-Tomang-Cengkareng dan Padalarang-Cileunyi. Selama tahun 2006 kedua ruas ini menghasilkan pendapatan hampir Rp 900 miliar. Anggaplah kita mengacu pada data tahun itu dan bahwa seperlima pembayaran menggunakan Smart Card. Berdasarkan asumsi konservatif ini saja, masyarakat pengguna tol harus mengeluarkan sedikitnya Rp 9 miliar dana tambahan dalam setahun.

Lebih mendasar lagi, di sini ada soal pemenuhan hak kita sebagai konsumen dan kewajiban Jasa Marga selaku pengelola jalan tol. Kita membayar tol untuk menikmati jasa yang ditawarkan pengelola: bisa melaju di jalur bebas hambatan dan, karenanya, menghemat waktu. Jasa Marga kerap gagal memenuhi kewajiban mendasarnya ini.

Karena itulah, penerapan metode ETC harus dilihat sebagai upaya Jasa Marga menyudahi wanprestasinya selama ini. Pemanfaatan sistem itu mesti diposisikan sebagai pemenuhan kewajiban Jasa Marga atas janji-janjinya memperbaiki layanan tol—termasuk yang dinyatakan dengan berbunga-bunga belum lama ini ketika drastis menaikkan tarif tol.

Yang terakhir, pengenaan biaya administrasi akan menjadi disinsentif bagi pengguna jalan tol untuk beralih ke sistem pembayaran ETC. Jika sistem ini ditujukan mengatasi kemacetan, yang perlu dirancang justru adalah berbagai struktur insentif yang bisa membuat pengguna jalan tol berduyun-duyun menggunakannya. Di Amerika Serikat, misalnya, sistem serupa bernama E-ZPass menawarkan tarif diskon bagi para komuter dan jam-jam tertentu yang padat.

Pendek kata, penolakan Menteri Sofyan adalah penolakan kami juga.

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Pertaruhan Kasus Pajak Asian Agri

Tajuk – Koran Tempo, 31 Oktober 2007

Pernyataan Direktur Jenderal Pajak Darmin Nasution mengernyitkan dahi kita. Darmin menerangkan bahwa salah satu opsi penanganan kasus dugaan penggelapan pajak Asian Agri Group yang sedang ditimbang pemerintah adalah penyelesaian di luar pengadilan (out of court settlement).

Mendengarnya kita terusik, karena penyidikan aparat pajak telah menyimpulkan bahwa sepak terjang kelompok usaha milik taipan Sukanto Tanoto itu berpotensi merugikan negara dalam skala yang luar biasa. Nilai sementara ditaksir mencapai Rp 1,3 triliun. Jika kelak terbukti, kasus ini akan dicatat sebagai salah satu manipulasi pajak terbesar dalam sejarah Republik.

Karena itu kita lantas bertanya, seberapa patut langkah ini diambil pemerintah?

Menurut hemat kami, kita sebaiknya tak buru-buru menyimpulkan ada udang di balik opsi tersebut. Selama ini, kami mengenal Menteri Keuangan Sri Mulyani dan Dirjen Darmin Nasution sebagai sosok yang berintegritas. Pemerintah sendiri belum mengambil keputusan final. Menteri Sri telah menyatakan akan tetap melimpahkan perkara ini ke kejaksaan dan menegaskan komitmennya untuk menangani kasus besar ini dengan berpegang teguh pada ketentuan hukum. Mari kita buka mata dan telinga untuk mengawasi dan memastikannya.

Di luar rasa was-was itu, perlu kami nyatakan bahwa, suka tak suka, hukum memang mengizinkan pemerintah mengambil langkah itu. Pasal 44B dalam UU 9/2004 tentang Ketentuan Umum dan Tata Cara Perpajakan, yang lantas diperbaharui UU 28/2007, menyatakan bahwa demi kepentingan penerimaan negara dan atas permintaan Menteri Keuangan, Jaksa Agung dapat menghentikan penyidikan.

Dari informasi yang kami himpun, kami memaklumi opsi ini masuk pertimbangan karena suatu alasan taktis. Jika perkara ini diajukan ke pengadilan, yang masih teramat korup itu, negara menghadapi resiko gigit jari—tersangka dihukum ringan, bahkan lolos, dan dikenai denda minimal, bahkan mungkin nol.

Namun demikian, di atas permakluman itu, kami mendesak agar pemerintah menjalankan amanat undang-undang dengan sepenuh-penuhnya. Pasal 44B itu mensyaratkan penyidikan bisa dihentikan jika, dan hanya jika, tersangka terlebih dahulu melunasi tunggakan pajaknya ditambah membayar denda sebesar empat kali dari nilai yang digelapkan.

Ketentuan ini tak boleh dikompromikan seinci pun. Nilai denda mesti dimaksimalkan. Berpatokan pada nilai dugaan penggelapan sebesar Rp 1,3 triliun, maka jika kelak terbukti, Asian Agri harus dipastikan menyetor tak kurang dari Rp 6,5 triliun ke kas negara.

Hanya dengan itulah rasa keadilan masyarakat bisa tetap terpenuhi. Hanya dengan itulah efek jera bisa tetap menjalar pada pengemplang pajak yang lain.

Kasus Asian Agri adalah suatu pertaruhan. Ia akan sangat menentukan kadar kepatuhan kita dalam membayar pajak, dan karenanya, menjadi pertaruhan bagi masa depan perpajakan yang merupakan tumpuan utama pendapatan nasional. Dari total penerimaan anggaran di tahun ini, pajak ditargetkan menyumbang 70,9 persen, atau Rp 500 triliun lebih.

Tak hanya itu, yang juga sedang dipertaruhkan adalah keberhasilan reformasi birokrasi yang kini sedang digelar di Departemen Keuangan, khususnya di Direktorat Jenderal Pajak. Penanganan kasus Asian Agri adalah tolok ukur kita dalam menilai apakah aparat pajak yang kini bergaji tinggi itu tak lagi takluk di hadapan mereka yang berlimpah uang dan kuasa.

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Memburu Kemakmuran

Tajuk – Koran Tempo, 19 Oktober 2007

Kabar menarik itu datang dari Hongkong. Selasa kemarin, sebuah laporan bertajuk Asia-Pacific Wealth 2007 dirilis. Isinya menyebutkan: di tahun kemarin, jumlah warga Indonesia yang memiliki kekayaan sedikitnya sejuta dolar Amerika mencapai 20 ribu orang. Jumlah ini bertambah 16,7 persen dibanding tahun 2005 dan merupakan angka pertumbuhan ketiga tertinggi di kawasan ini, setelah Singapura dan India.

Jika kekayaan tersebut halal diperoleh, itu tentu kabar baik. Boleh jadi, ini pertanda perekonomian kita yang tengah kembali beranjak naik.

Gambaran optimistis itu pula yang kita lihat dari menurunnya grafik kemiskinan. Kalau berpegang pada hasil Survey Sosial Ekonomi Nasional, tahun ini jumlah kaum papa berkurang 2,13 juta dari total 39,3 juta di tahun sebelumnya.

Namun, saat kita berpuas diri masihlah jauh. Jumlah penduduk miskin di negeri ini tetap kelewat banyak. Kesenjangan kaya-miskin di tanah air pun cukup lebar, 34,2 menurut indeks Gini 2002. Meski lebih baik ketimbang Thailand atau Vietnam, angka ini jauh di atas kebanyakan negara maju yang berada di kisaran 10.

Karena itu, tak bosan kami mendesak pemerintah supaya lebih tegas memerangi korupsi. Merosotnya skor kita dalam Indeks Persepsi Korupsi-Transparansi Internasional tahun ini—dari 2,4 tahun lalu menjadi 2,3—adalah lampu kuning yang tak boleh diabaikan.

Sebagaimana ditunjukkan oleh banyak studi, korupsi mengganjal pertumbuhan dan merintangi investasi. Lebih penting lagi, praktek tercela itu paling keras memukul kaum miskin. Merampas akses kelompok tak berpunya pada berbagai layanan vital seperti pendidikan dan kesehatan, korupsi berperan langsung dalam melebarkan kesenjangan. Pemberantasan korupsi adalah variabel determinan supaya kita melihat suatu keadilan: orang jadi kaya bukan karena mencoleng, sementara yang miskin bisa bangkit karena tak dirampas haknya.

Kami menyadari pemerintah tengah menggelar berbagai upaya untuk mengentaskan kemiskinan. Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat, misalnya, digelar dengan ambisi mengangkat pendapatan 16 juta warga miskin dan membuka lapangan kerja bagi 24 juta orang. Kami mendesak agar program-program penting seperti ini dipastikan tak hanya mengkilat di atas kertas.

Untuk itu, ada baiknya kita menyimak saran Joseph Stiglitz. Peraih Nobel Ekonomi ini baru saja menganjurkan kita untuk mempelajari “keajaiban ekonomi Malaysia.” Dengan menyimpan dulu segala kejengkelan kita terhadap negeri jiran, coba kita pelajari capaian hebat mereka dalam memburu kemakmuran.

Merdeka setengah abad lalu sebagai salah satu negara paling miskin, Malaysia kini menjelma menjadi salah satu perekonomian yang tumbuh paling pesat di dunia—bersama Cina, Taiwan, Korea Selatan, dan Thailand. Lebih hebat lagi, mereka berhasil memotong tingkat kemiskinan 2,8 persen setahun dan memasang target akan menghapus kemelaratan dalam tiga tahun ke depan. Malaysia juga sukses mengatasi kesenjangan kaya-miskin, yang dicatat Stiglitz, dicapai “bukan dengan menarik yang di atas ke bawah, tapi dengan mendorong yang di bawah ke atas.” Segala capaian itu diraih berkat sejumlah kebijakan jitu: investasi besar-besaran di sektor pendidikan dan teknologi, mendorong peningkatan tabungan, dan kebijakan afirmatif yang efektif.

Nasionalisme dan patriotisme kita yang belakangan bergemuruh hebat, ada baiknya kita arahkan untuk menjawab satu pertanyaan ini: jika Malaysia bisa, kenapa kita tidak?

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Merindukan Gerald Shur

Opini – Majalah Tempo, 4 Oktober 2007

Pada lari ke mana “kaum reformis” ketika peran nyata mereka dibutuhkan?

Lembaga Perlindungan Saksi dan Korban (LPSK) adalah mimpi kita sedari lama. Telah bertahun-tahun kaum reformis menyuarakan bahwa keberadaan institusi ini begitu mendesaknya dalam memerangi korupsi, tindak kriminal teroganisir, dan kejahatan kemanusiaan luar biasa. Namun, setelah fondasinya dipancangkan Undang-Undang Nomor 13 Tahun 2006, seleksi calon pemimpin LPSK kembali dibelit masalah klasik: sepi dari nama-nama terpercaya. Menurut seorang anggota panitia seleksi, dari 100 lebih calon yang mendaftar baru dua yang bobotnya bisa diandalkan.

Ini amat kita sesalkan. Pada lari ke mana mereka yang selama ini meributkan arti penting lembaga ini? Ada di mana “kaum reformis” saat peran nyata mereka dibutuhkan untuk berbuat lebih dari sekadar menyuarakan ide-ide cemerlang di koran?

Kita merindukan sosok Gerald Shur. Dia jaksa hebat yang memprakarsai program perlindungan saksi di Amerika Serikat, WITSEC. Gagasan Shur muncul di akhir tahun 1960-an, suatu masa ketika negeri Abang Sam sengit memerangi kelompok-kelompok mafia yang tak sekedip pun segan membunuh saksi kunci yang bisa menyeret mereka ke bui. Sejak dibidani pada 1970, program ini telah melindungi nyawa 7500 saksi dan 9500 anggota keluarga mereka.

Ini memang kerja besar lagi berat, tapi amatlah strategis. Lihat hasil yang dipetik WITSEC ketika melindungi Philip Tolomeo, kolektor piutang Calabrese—kelompok mafia yang kebrutalannya terkenal di seantero Chicago pada 1978 sampai 1988. Menggelapkan uang bosnya, Tolomeo kabur dengan menggondol setumpuk dokumen penting yang memerinci kegiatan ilegal geng itu. Ia lalu masuk program WITSEC. Berkat kesaksian dan dokumen Tolomeo, dua gembong Calabrese yang lama tak tersentuh hukum berhasil dijebloskan ke bui.

Tapi coba kita bandingkan dengan nasib Vincentius Amin Sutanto, mantan pengendali keuangan Grup Asian Agri. Seperti halnya Tolomeo, Vincent bukan malaikat. Mengaku telah menggelapkan uang perusahaan, ia lalu menjadi peniup-peluit dalam kasus dugaan penggelapan pajak berskala luar biasa di perusahaan milik Sukanto Tanoto itu. Berkat kesaksian dan dokumen bukti yang dia serahkan, suatu kejahatan yang lebih besar boleh jadi bisa dibongkar. Tak cuma itu, uang negara pun mungkin dapat diselamatkan—sedikitnya Rp 800 miliar menurut Direktorat Jenderal Pajak.

Karena nyanyian sumbangnya, Vincent mengaku mendapat teror. Begitu pula anak istrinya. Ironisnya, bukan dilindungi aparat, pengadilan malah menjatuhkan vonis tak masuk akal baginya. Ia dihukum bui 11 tahun, bukan hanya karena terbukti melakukan penggelapan—kejahatan yang ia memang akui—tapi juga pencucian uang yang tak dilakukannya.

Dalam situasi memprihatinkan ini, kita perlu banyak Gerald Shur di daftar calon pemimpin LPSK. Panitia telah mengundurkan tenggat pendaftaran hingga 20 Oktober mendatang dan tengah proaktif berkampanye ke berbagai daerah. Sejalan dengan itu, kami mendesak para tokoh LSM, cendekiawan, dan lainnya, yang selama ini menyandang predikat gagah sebagai pendekar refomasi hukum dan lantang mendesakkan pembentukan LPSK, untuk mempertanggungjawabkan klaim dan tuntutan mereka itu dengan segera ikut mendaftar. Berbagai dalih seperti enggan “dikerjai” dalam uji kelayakan di DPR, mohon maaf, adalah bentuk kecengengan yang tak bisa kami maklumi.

* * *

Birma, Bukan Myanmar

Tajuk - Koran Tempo, 29 September 2007

Kali ini kami tak sepakat dengan Shakespeare. Nama, dalam kasus ini, menjadi sesuatu yang prinsipiil. Buat kami, negeri tetangga yang tengah bergolak menuntut hak demokrasinya itu bernama Birma, bukan Myanmar.

Negeri Seribu Pagoda terlahir merdeka dengan nama Republik Sosialis Persatuan Birma. Namun, di tahun 1988, tentara melancarkan kudeta, membentuk junta militer yang memerintah dengan tangan besi, lalu mengganti nama negeri nan permai ini menjadi Myanmar.

Dewan Pembangunan dan Ketenteraman Negara (SPDC), junta militer yang kini dipimpin Jenderal Tan Shwe, memberangus demokrasi dan menindas oposisi. Pemilu parlemen 1990, yang dimenangkan partai oposisi Liga Nasional untuk Demokrasi (NLD), dibatalkan. Padahal, NLD meraih kemenangan telak—mereka merebut hampir 80 persen dari jumlah kursi yang diperebutkan. Para pemimpinnya dijebloskan ke penjara. Sampai hari ini, telah 12 tahun Sekretaris Jenderal NLD sekaligus peraih Nobel Perdamaian, Aung San Suu Kyi, mendekam di tahanan rumah.

Sejak itu lah, nama “Birma” mengkristal sebagai simbol perlawanan kelompok pro-demokrasi, dan “Myanmar” menjadi perlambang tirani. Di Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa, yang mendasarkan langkahnya pertama-tama pada asas kedaulatan masing-masing negara, memang nama Myanmar yang resmi dipakai. Tapi, negara-negara demokratis Barat, seperti Amerika Serikat, Inggris, Australia, dan Irlandia, tak mengakuinya. Sejumlah media di negara-negara itu, seperti BBC dan Financial Times pun secara konsisten menggunakan nama Birma dalam pemberitaan mereka. Di garis ini pula lah kami ikut berdiri.

Buat kami, sekali lagi, persoalannya lebih dari sekadar sebuah nama. Menonton ribuan warga dan bhiksu Birma tumpah ke jalan, ditembaki tentara, terluka, dan sepuluh diantaranya tewas; menyeret kenangan kita pada masa-masa perjuangan reformasi di tahun 1998—demonstran yang menyemut, Jakarta yang hitam hangus, panser yang menderu, dan Presiden Suharto yang lengser terpaksa.

Sejak itu, kita hidup lebih baik, setidaknya secara politik. Dengan segala eksesnya, kita merasakan betapa leganya menghirup udara kebebasan di alam demokrasi. Kebebasan pers ditegakkan—Majalah Tempo yang diberangus rezim otoriter Suharto bisa terbit kembali, dan koran ini pun lahir bersama berbagai media lain yang tumbuh menjamur. Kita kini bisa memilih langsung presiden, gubernur, dan walikota—satu hal yang sudah kita anggap lumrah, tapi masih jadi mimpi buat para biksu yang sedang berdemonstrasi di jalan-jalan Ragoon sana. Di dunia internasional, apalagi setelah demokrasi Thailand kembali terjerembab, Indonesia digadang-gadang sebagai negeri paling demokratis di Asia Tenggara.

Di atas rahmat demokrasi itu lah, seyogyanya Pemerintah mengambil peran lebih aktif dan bersikap lebih tegas dalam menyokong persemaian demokrasi di Birma. Sekadar himbauan, kecaman, dan manuver verbal tak lagi memadai. Rezim Tan Shwe sudah lama menulikan telinganya pada tuntuntan demokratisasi dari dunia internasional. Langkah dan desakan yang lebih kongkrit dalam kerangka ASEAN, misalnya, amat diperlukan. Salah satu bentuknya bisa seperti yang pernah disuarakan mantan Perdana Menteri Malaysia Mahathir Mohammad. Di tahun 1993 silam, ia mengancam akan memprakarsai petisi untuk mengeluarkan Birma dari ASEAN sehubungan tindakan represif junta militer terhadap Suu Kyi.

Keperluan akan adanya tekanan keras seperti itu, perlu kembali didesakkan, supaya Myanmar kembali menjadi Birma.

* * *

Jangan Pertaruhkan Martabat Dewan

Tajuk Koran Tempo, 18 September 2007

Perdebatan tentang perlu tidaknya Nurdin Halid diberhentikan sebagai anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat menyimpan suatu keanehan. Persoalan itu, di mata kami, sungguh sebening kaca. Nurdin, yang baru divonis bersalah oleh Mahkamah Agung karena menyelewengkan dana pendistribusian minyak goreng Bulog senilai Rp 169,7 miliar, jelas tak patut menyandang predikat terhormat sebagai wakil rakyat.

Sehari setelah dilantik menjadi anggota Dewan dari Fraksi Golkar, Nurdin dihukum Majelis Hakim untuk dikerangkeng selama dua tahun dan membayar denda Rp 30 juta. Hari ini, statusnya di parlemen akan diputuskan dalam rapat harian Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Golkar.

Satu langkah hukum memang masih tersisa untuk sang terpidana. Jika memiliki bukti baru yang mendukung, ia masih bisa mengajukan peninjauan kembali. Artinya, jika langkah itu dia tempuh, Nurdin bisa berdalih bahwa putusan itu belum berkekuatan hukum tetap. Patut kita catat, selama ini dalih legalistik formal seperti itu selalu diajukan para politisi dan pejabat yang sedang berurusan dengan hukum untuk bertahan di kursinya.

Argumen semacam ini, kami khawatir, sedang menuju ke satu arah: standar etik dan kultur politik bangsa ini sedang mengalami erosi besar-besaran. Dua faktor itu, menurut keyakinan kami, seharusnya senantiasa ditempatkan di atas argumen hukum formal.

Coba kita berkaca pada budaya politik Jepang. Kita menyaksikan betapa politisi Negeri Sakura memilih langsung mengundurkan diri setelah aibnya terbongkar ke muka publik. Salah satu contohnya baru kita lihat Rabu pekan lalu ketika Perdana Menteri Shinzo Abe meletakkan jabatannya. Keputusan ini dibuat di bawah tekanan partainya, Partai Demokratik Liberal (LDP), berkait dengan rencana sebuah media membongkar skandal penggelapan pajak Abe. Mei sebelumnya, Menteri Pertanian Toshikatsu Matsuoka bahkan memilih /harakiri/. Penyebabnya, “hanya” karena ia dipergoki telah menggelembungkan pengeluaran kantor dan tak mengumumkan sumbangan politik yang diterimanya.

Sungguh kontras fenomena itu dengan apa yang kita saksikan di tanah air. Politisi negeri ini, jangankan sekadar dibongkar aibnya di media massa, bahkan setelah ditetapkan sebagai terdakwa dan terpidana pun masih tampil penuh percaya diri di muka publik, berpesta ke sana-kemari, dan kukuh bertahan di kursinya.

Tambahan lagi, catatan hidup Nurdin tak seputih kapas. Berulang kali ia dililit berbagai perkara kriminal, meski selalu berhasil lolos. Pada 2004 ia sempat menjadi tersangka kasus penggelapan puluhan ribu ton gula impor ilegal. Tujuh tahun sebelumnya, dia sempat ditahan dan diadili dalam kasus penggelapan dana simpanan wajib petani cengkeh sebesar Rp 115 miliar.

Karena itu, pernyataan tegas Ketua Umum Partai Golongan Karya Jusuf Kalla yang tak akan melindungi sang terpidana, tentu kita dukung. Status Nurdin adalah pertaruhan martabat parlemen kita—yang sudah sedemikian compang-camping dikoyak berbagai isu korupsi kronis. Pemecatannya, mudah-mudahan, akan menjadi pertanda berakhirnya budaya politik yang telah lama membuat kita merasa risih.

* * *

DPR with Integrity, How Possible?

Published at Tempo Daily Newspaper, August 27, 2007

By: Karaniya Dharmasaputra
Research Associate of Transparency International Indonesia

Countries’ experiences have shown that parliament, in fact, could be an alternative in taking pivotal role in combating corruption. This potential, however, is frequently ignored. As we have been seeing in this country, efforts to promote good-governance have been being focused merely on two government branches, the executive and judicative. The reform has not touched the chronic corruption within the parliament.

Theoretically, in a democracy, parliament is an institution where citizens could hang upon their interests of good governance. This relates to the four key roles of legislator, namely to pass laws to control corruption (legislation function), to make sure that government undertakes its authorities with accountability (oversight function), to protect his/her constituents’ interest from the adverse impact of corruption (representation function), and not less important, to create and maintain political-will to fight this illegal and harmful practice.

These strategic positions have been displayed in countries that even belong to the list of the most-corrupt ones in the world. Kenya and Uganda are the two examples.

The Goldenberg Scandal—the 24 trillion shilling embezzlement in the Kenyan Central Bank and the largest corruption case in the Sub-Saharan Africa history—was firstly revealed by two Kenyan members of parliament from the opposition party. Besides, war on corruption in this country cannot be detached from the significant role of the Kombo Commission, the anti-corruption commission in LEGCO (Legislative Council of Kenya) that are named after its highly respected chairman, Musikari Kombo. In 1975, Legislator J.M. Kariuki was even murdered because of his persistent effort to unfold corruption within the government (Matiangi 2006).

As well, Uganda’s history notes the pivotal role of their MPs. Working hand in hand with the press and NGOs, they disclosed the corruption scandals of two powerful ministers, Minister of Basic Education Brigadier General Jim K. Muhwezi and Minister of Finance Sam Kutesa, and then successfully forced them to step down (Smith 2006).

Unfortunately, DPR-RI is not the LEGCO. Instead of being seen as a promising solution, Indonesians perceive their legislators as a source of these illicit practices. The 2006 Global Corruption Barometer of Transparency International Indonesia concluded that majority of the respondents place the legislative as the most corrupt institution in the country. Press has also frequently reported of how bribery and extortion have badly distorted our legislation processes.

But we may never surrender our hope. At least, there are three opportunities that can be explored to formulate any future reforms.

First, any of those currently creeping in the darkness under the DPR benches must be placed on the spotlight. One of the most crucial recommendations is to design the legislation processes as transparent as possible. Now, since the public information system is not available, we can never recognize who MPs supporting or opposing certain clauses in a bill formulation process.

The consensus method that prevails in the current legislation process must be altered to the open-vote system. The lobbying mechanism that is running under the table must be lifted to the transparent-surface by regulating that as what have been done in the United States through the Lobbying Act. From there, we may hope there will be a more concrete reward and punishment mechanism between the legislatures and their constituents.

The second chance emerges from the concept of “multiple veto points”—the distribution of legislation powers onto various centrums. In the American federal government system, for example, Senate, the House of Representatives, and President, share authorities in passing or blocking a bill that makes none of them is able to monopolize. Susan Rose-Ackerman (1999), a professor in law and politics at Yale University, U.S., argues that such system—beside its negative sides e.g. pro status-quo bias—tends to make corruption in the legislation processes becomes so expensive and risky, and at the end, minimizes level of corruption.

In our country, this phenomenon we see through the emergence of the Constitution Court (MK) as an alternative to challenge the DPR’s legislation product (in relation to the Constitution). In this regard, the idea to expanding the Regional Representatives Council’s (DPD) authority is important to support. If we are able to mold DPD as an institution like the U.S. Senate, for instance, DPD potentially becomes a balancing power to DPR that is currently very dominant and corrupt. As a result, the economic law of corruption, we hope, starts talking: competition up, bribery-cost down.

The third possibility to explore is providing support and international network for the MPs who are committed in combating corruption. I believe that such group of MPs does exist, albeit the number is relatively small. One of the networks to be considered is the Global Organization of Parliamentarians against Corruption (GOPAC). Declared in Ottawa, Canada, in 2002, GOPAC is a global web of MPs that provides information, tools, trainings, advocacy, and other efforts in supporting its members in fighting corruption. Engaging the legislatures who has integrity in this network, could increase the incentive, motivation, and technical skills of those MPs to start fighting corruption and cleaning up the DPR itself.

We have long been queasy in watching how our legislators are ethics-blinded. Therefore, the demand to reform our parliament must be pushed immediately.

DPR yang Anti-Korupsi, Mungkinkah?

Opini - Koran Tempo, Senin, 27 Agustus 2007

Oleh: Karaniya Dharmasaputra

*) Wartawan Tempo, peneliti tamu Transparency International Indonesia, karaniya@gwu.edu

Pengalaman banyak negara menunjukkan parlemen, sebetulnya, bisa menjadi pilar alternatif dalam pemberantasan korupsi. Sayangnya, potensi ini kerap diabaikan. Seperti yang sedang kita saksikan di tanah air, upaya membenahi tata kelola pemerintahan sampai hari ini masih dipusatkan di dua cabang pemerintahan, yakni lembaga eksekutif dan yudikatif. Korupsi di Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) nyaris belum tersentuh reformasi.

Padahal, di atas kertas, dalam sistem demokrasi, parlemen adalah tempat di mana warga negara bisa menggantungkan harapan mereka akan terwujudnya tata kelola pemerintahan yang baik. Hal ini terkait dengan empat fungsi pokok legislator, yakni: memproduksi undang-undang untuk mengontrol korupsi (fungsi legislasi), memastikan pemerintah menjalankan kewenangannya secara akuntabel (pengawasan), melindungi kepentingan konstituen dari dampak negatif korupsi (representasi), dan yang tak kalah penting, menciptakan kemauan politik untuk memerangi praktek tercela ini.

Tak kurang, posisi strategis ini telah dipertontonkan di negara-negara yang bahkan masuk kategori paling korup sejagat. Kenya dan Uganda adalah contohnya.

Skandal Goldenberg—pembobolan Bank Sentral Kenya senilai 24 triliun shilling dan merupakan kasus korupsi terbesar dalam sejarah Sub-Sahara Afrika —pertama kali dibongkar oleh dua anggota parlemen Kenya (Legislative Council of Kenya, LEGCO) dari partai oposisi. Selain itu, perang melawan korupsi di negara ini tak mungkin dilepaskan dari peran penting Komisi Kombo, komisi anti-korupsi di parlemen yang dinamai menurut ketuanya yang amat disegani, Musikari Kombo. Di tahun 1975, Legislator J.M. Kariuki bahkan sampai dibunuh karena begitu gigih membongkar korupsi di tubuh pemerintahan (Matiangi 2006).

Lembaran sejarah Uganda juga mencatat peran penting anggota parlemen mereka. Bahu membahu bersama pers dan LSM, sejumlah anggota parlemen dari partai oposisi tanpa ampun menelanjangi skandal korupsi dua menteri yang amat berkuasa di negeri itu, Menteri Pendidikan Dasar Brigjen Jim K. Muhwezi dan Menteri Keuangan Sam Kutesa, dan memaksa mereka turun dari jabatannya (Smith 2006).

Sayang seribu sayang, DPR-RI bukanlah LEGCO. Ketimbang dilihat sebagai alternatif solusi, wakil rakyat di Senayan kini dicibir sebagai biang praktek tercela ini. Survey Barometer Korupsi Global 2006 Transparency International Indonesia menyimpulkan mayoritas responden mendudukkan lembaga legislatif sebagai institusi terkorup di seluruh negeri. Liputan pers berkali-kali mengungkap betapa penyuapan dan pemerasan telah sedemikiran rupa membengkokkan proses legislasi di Republik.

Tapi kita tak pernah boleh kehilangan harapan. Setidaknya, ada tiga peluang yang bisa dipertimbangkan buat merumuskan upaya reformasi ke depan.

Pertama, apa yang berlangsung remang-remang di DPR perlu dibuat terang-benderang. Salah satu yang krusial adalah membuat proses legislasi setransparan mungkin. Sekarang, karena tak ada sistem informasi publik yang memadai, kita tak pernah bisa tahu siapa wakil rakyat yang mendukung atau menolak pasal tertentu dalam suatu pembahasan RUU.

Sistem "musyawarah mufakat" yang kini diberlakukan dalam setiap pembahasan RUU pun musti diubah jadi pemungutan suara secara terbuka. Proses lobi yang kini berlangsung di bawah meja harus diangkat ke permukaan dengan meregulasinya, sebagaimana yang dilakukan di Amerika Serikat melalui Lobbying Act. Dari situ, bisa diharapkan tercipta suatu mekanisme insentif dan hukuman yang lebih riil antara wakil rakyat dan konstituennya.

Peluang kedua datang dari konsep "titik veto berganda (multiple veto points),” yakni terdistribusinya kekuasaan legislasi ke dalam berbagai sentrum. Dalam sistem pemerintahan federal Amerika, misalnya, Senat, House of Representative (DPR) dan Presiden berbagi kewenangan dalam pengesahan atau pemblokiran suatu RUU, sehingga tak satupun dari ketiganya bisa memonopoli. Susan Rose-Ackerman (1999), profesor hukum dan politik Universitas Yale, Amerika Serikat, berpendapat sistem ini—di luar sisi negatifnya, misalnya bias pada status quo—cenderung membuat korupsi dalam proses legislasi menjadi sangat mahal dan beresiko, dan pada akhirnya meminimalkan tingkat korupsi.

Di tanah air, fenomena ini kita lihat dengan lahirnya Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK) sebagai alternatif untuk menantang keabsahan produk legislasi DPR (yang berkait dengan konstitusi). Dalam hal ini, ide perluasan kewenangan Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (DPD) penting didukung. Jika kelak berhasil dijadikan sebagai institusi seperti Senat Amerika, misalnya, DPD bisa menjadi kekuatan pengimbang kekuasaan DPR yang kini begitu dominan dan korup. Dari situ, hukum ekonomi-korupsi kita harapkan akan mulai bicara: kompetisi naik, biaya korupsi turun.

Faktor ketiga adalah sokongan dan jaringan internasional bagi anggota DPR yang berkomitmen memerangi korupsi. Saya yakin kaum ini bukan tak ada, meski jumlahnya memang relatif kecil. Salah satu jaringan yang patut dipertimbangkan adalah Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption (GOPAC). Dideklarasikan di Ottawa, Kanada, pada 2002 silam, GOPAC merupakan jaringan global anggota parlemen yang menyediakan informasi, perangkat, pelatihan, advokasi, dan berbagai upaya lain untuk menyokong upaya anggotanya memerangi korupsi. Melibatkan wakil rakyat yang masih punya integritas ke dalam jaringan ini, bisa meningkatkan insentif, keberanian dan kemampuan teknis mereka untuk mulai ikut memerangi korupsi, termasuk membersihkan DPR itu sendiri.

Mual sudah kita melihat sepak-terjang para wakil rakyat yang tak lagi peduli etika. Karenanya, tuntutan mereformasi parlemen tak bisa tidak musti segera didesakkan.

* * *

The Turning Point: The United States and the Indonesian Communist Backed Coup Attempt of 1965

Karaniya Dharmasaputra
*) Master of Public Policy Program, George Washington University, May 15, 2005

Introduction

The so-called “September Movement” of 1965 was a critical turning point in Indonesia – United States relations in the Cold War. This communist backed coup was also one of the darkest pages in Indonesian history. Until today, historians are still struggling in answering many questions surrounding this bloody incident.

At dawn, on October 1, a group of Indonesian soldiers which named itself the “30 September Movement” kidnapped and killed seven Army-anti Communist generals including Army Commander General Ahmad Yani. Defense Minister General A.H. Nasution was also on the target. Yet, the rebels failed to capture and murder him.

The movement announced that they took over the power to anticipate what they called a “General’s coup d’etat” with a plot to topple President Sukarno, the first President of the Republic of Indonesia. The rebels also claimed that the alleged Generals’ plot was American inspired.[1] At the same day, the group’s leader, Commander of the Presidential Guard Regiment Cakrabirawa Lt. Colonel Untung, issued a decree stating that 45 members of a leftist “Revolutionary Council” would administer the government.

The official version of Indonesian history tells that the Indonesian Communist Party, PKI, backed the September Movement. Harian Rakjat, a PKI’s affiliated newspaper, indicated that support before later withdrew it.[2] Indonesians name this coup “G30S/PKI” or “Gestapu;” an acronym of the September 30^th Movement of the Indonesian Communist Party.

However, the movement turned out to be an abortive coup. Led by General Suharto, the Army Strategic Reserve (KOSTRAD) and the later second Indonesian president, the Army cracked down the September movement. This backlash was then followed by a brutal massacre of PKI leaders and members across the country. The killings were largely undertaken by Muslim youths under the military’s blessing.

The September movement resulted in the end of Sukarno’s power and the beginning of Suharto’s 32 year militaristic-authoritarian rule over the country. This also became a dramatic reversal point of Indonesia’s foreign relations. Suharto stirred the country away from Beijing and Moscow, and turned that to Washington and its allies. The downfall of President Sukarno and PKI, the fourth largest communist party in the world, indeed served the United States’ best interest in the region during the Cold War.

The main objective of this paper is to investigate the US foreign policy and involvement in the 1965 coup attempt in Indonesia. In reaching that goal, I try to address the following four major questions surrounding this incident that have been haunting Indonesian history for years. Those are:

· Was there any reasonable proof to support a long speculation that the US government, particularly CIA, has instigated the September coup attempt?

· In what level the US embassy at Jakarta was involved in the Communist brutal massacre?

· Was there any base for an allegation that in the sake of eliminating communism influence as its top priority, US government supported the establishment of a military-heavy influenced-government in Indonesia?

· What was the US policy in dealing with Islamic movements in Indonesia? Did the US utilize the Islamic movements to halt the Communist influence in Indonesia?

To answer those questions, this paper utilizes primary resources of the US government archives, notably the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) documents. These documents have been declassified by the Department of State in 1998-99 and have printed and bounded by the US Government Printing Office under the title ”Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-68, Volume XXVI, Indonesia, Malaysia-Singapore, Philippines.” However, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Department of State subsequently stalled and prevented the release of the volume. Thank to the National Security Archive of George Washington University that has obtained the Indonesia volume and then posted it on their website.[3] Beside the FRUS documents, this paper also employs other related documents from the National Archives and Records Administration – RG59, US National Security Council and the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

Background

During the Cold War, Indonesia was a strategic country in the US interests. Its gigantic size, with more than 100 million populations, made Indonesia as the sixth most populous country in the world in 1965. Its location between the Pacific and Indian Ocean, and between Australia and the mainland, placed Indonesia as a focal point in the region. And last but not least, amid the American’s fear of the prevalence of the domino theory in the Southeast Asia, the rapid growth of the communist influence in the country made US leaders believed that Indonesia is a crucial ideological battlefield they had to win.

Gained its independence in 1945 from the Dutch-British-Japanese colonialism, the infant Indonesia was born with a bold sentiment of anti-imperialism and a strong favor of communism. For the past several years, before the 1965 September movement was underway, most Indonesians were exposed and affected by a constant pro-Communist propaganda. Along with this stream, anti-American spirit placed its deep root in most Indonesians’ minds.

President Sukarno played a substantial role in shaping the nation’s leftist orientation. As a founding father of the newborn Republic of Indonesia, Sukarno had towered over Indonesian political life for more than a generation. He listed himself after Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin—but not Mao, who was still alive—as a prophet and what he called himself “the Great Leader of the Revolution.”[4] Sukarno, actually, was not a communist in a formal sense. He was rather an admirer of communism since he perceived that as an effective tool to mobilize his society and to advance his Marxist-nationalistic ideology. In this regard, he gave his strong support to the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) that was closely connected to the Red Chinese Government and he later even vowed to bring the country into a “socialist stage.”

* * *

These circumstances laid an important ground for the US foreign policy toward Indonesia. Halting the expansion of communist influence was the Washington’s highest priority during this period. At latest in 1953 the US National Security Council had formulated a series of policy to undertake an “appropriate action, in collaboration with other friendly countries, to prevent permanent communist control” of Indonesia.[5]

In the Statement of Policy NSC 5405 of 1954 the US National Security Council underlined the goal of the US foreign policy towards Indonesian communism. The fall of Indochina made US worrying at the expansion of communism throughout the Southeast Asia, including to Indonesia. This fear was formulated as what so called “the domino theory.” In 1954, Secretary of State Dulles warned that the fall of Indochina would quickly collapse the rest of Southeast Asia like a “row of dominoes.”[6]

In 1965, this theory had also been terrorizing the US embassy at Jakarta. “One after another, faster and faster, the PKI’s enemies were over-run; the domino theory was being tested before our eyes,” Richard Cabot Howland, a foreign-service officer at the Embassy, described how his corps assessed the situation at that time.[7]

As the PKI’s grip became stronger, Indonesia became as a crucial major target of the Communist powers and as a significant battlefield between Moscow and Peking.[8] Washington saw this development would inevitably determine the world political balance. In this regard, the National Intelligence Estimate concluded:

“Indonesia’s formal accession to communism would have a heavy impact on world politics. It would be seen as a major change in the international balance of political forces and would inject new life into the thesis that communism is the wave of the future… Indonesia would provide a powerful example for the underdeveloped world and hence a credit to communism and a setback for Western prestige.”[9]

Washington believed these losses would pose a substantial threat to the US security interest in the Far East, particularly in Malaysia, Philippines, and Australia.[10] Moreover, considering these countries’ positions as the primary world suppliers of natural rubber, tin, petroleum, and many other strategic commodities, US saw that the loss of Indonesia and other Southeast Asia nations would substantially strengthen the Soviet bloc and endangered economic stability of the US and its allies.[11]

Sukarnos’ hostile behaviors toward the United States provided another harbor for the Washington’s fear. Persistently, the Indonesian president characterized the West as the representative of neo-colonialism and imperialism. Repeatedly, he even declared his intention to purge the United States from Indonesia. And consistently, every facet of his policies clashed with US’ best interests. When the US government gave its recognition and support to Malaysia, Sukarno refused to accept the existence of the British-backed newborn country. Not only that, since August 1964 he even waged a military confrontation against it. In the same month, on August 10, Sukarno recognized North Vietnam and opposed the US intervention policy in South Vietnam.[12]

Being ambitious to be a paramount leader of the Afro-Asian nations, Sukarno declared the establishment of what he dubbed the NEFOS, the New Emerging Forces that consisted of developing countries, against the OLDEFOS, the Old Established Forces that meant the US and its Western Allies. This made Washington nervous that Sukarno’s Indonesia would drag other countries to the same direction. “If Indo virus is allowed to spread unchecked in AA [Afro-Asian] world it could be particularly insidious front runner for international communism.”[13]

Sukarno grew “the virus” vigorously. Under his blessing, PKI’s influence expanded very fast. In 1965, the communist party claimed having three million members. With the unchallenged President Sukarno’s support, PKI’s members and sympathizers had successfully penetrated into many strategic positions in the central and local government. Borrowing the American intelligence’s assessment, PKI became “the best organized and most dynamic political entity in Indonesia.”[14]

As PKI’s aggressiveness mounted, the period of 1964-65 was marked by a rising tide of anti-American outrages.[15] Started in September 1964, mobs protesting the US policy on Vietnam constantly launched demonstrations against various American facilities in Indonesia. The United States Information Service’s (USIS) libraries in Jakarta and Surabaya were attacked. The Consulate offices in Medan and Surabaya were struck. The American rubber estates in Sumatra were taken over. And there were serious threats to nationalize the American oil companies.[16] In the State Secretary Dean Rusk’s words, the Indo-American relations at that time had “reached critical watershed.”[17]

Less than three weeks prior to the September movement, Indo-American relation was almost completely crushed. In his telegram to the Embassy at Jakarta, Secretary Rusk discussed his intention to close the Surabaya consulate that had been hit earlier by a mobs riot. He also ordered the US Ambassador to Indonesia Marshall Green to evacuate US embassy employees and their dependents at Surabaya, and other cities, to Jakarta.[18]

Sukarno’s bluff in July 1965 to explode an atomic bomb sent another red-code to Washington. This was worsened by the US suspicion that the Red Chinese government stood behind this move in order to strengthen Sukarno’s prominent position as the leader of the Afro-Asian countries. The Indonesian Army leader also repeatedly made the similar statements. Earlier, General Hartono, Director of the Army Arsenal, announced that 200 scientists had been building a bomb to be detonated at the Armed Forces Day celebration on October 5, 1965; or only five days after the September 30 Movement then broke out. On July 27, for the third time, Hartono reiterated his statement that the atomic bomb would be tested after the Afro-Asian conference in Algiers in November that year.[19]

Amid this heating period, the September coup took place.

Did CIA Plot the Coup?

It is a long speculation among Indonesians that CIA has engineered the September coup attempt in order to raise the public hatred toward the communists. This suspicion is not without ground. Several documents showed compelling indications leading to such direction.

Since January 1965, US government was aware of Sukarno’s very bad illness and how it sparked a succession issue in Indonesia. Washington believed that if Sukarno indeed passed away, the Indonesian Army leaders would play a major role in the country’s future political orientation. Yet, in the same time, the PKI’s influence would still persist and the failure of the anti-communist elements within the Army to take a firm grip on the power would pave a way for the Communist to expand its influence and to take control over the country.

An assessment prepared by Sherman Kent, the Director of the Office of National Estimates of the CIA, on January 26, 1965, stated:

“[I]f Sukarno lives on for some time to come, the chances of the Communist Party (PKI) to assume power will probably continue to improve… Should Sukarno leave the scene in near future, we believe that the initial struggle to replace him would be won by Army and non-Communist elements, though Communists would continue to play an important role… unless the non-Communist leaders displayed more backbone, effectiveness, and unity than they have to date, the chances of eventual PKI dominance of Indonesia would quickly mount.”[20]

Another interesting indication is provided by a memorandum prepared for the 303 Committee, a US interdepartmental committee that was responsible in reviewing and authorizing covert operations, on February 23, 1965—or seven months before the September movement was under the way. The document, entitled ‘Progress Report on [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Covert Action in Indonesia,’ discussed “an operational program of political action in Indonesia” formulated and developed by the Department of State and another US government agency, presumably CIA, since the summer of 1964.[21]

The objective of this operation was stated very clear: To halt the PKI and Red Chinese Government’s influence on Indonesian foreign and domestic policies, and to simultaneously strengthen the non-Communist elements in Indonesia. Several methods were designed to employ, including “covert liaison with and support to existing anti-Communist group, …black letter operations, media operations, including possibly black radio, and political actions within existing Indonesian organizations and institutions” and to provide “covert assistance to individuals and organizations capable of and prepared to take obstructive action against PKI.”

The memorandum noted that this operation had been approved by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, the US Ambassador to Indonesia, and then by the 303 Committee. It also noted that a CIA official urged the 303 Committee to establish “a larger political design or master plan to arrest the Indonesian march into the Chinese camp” considering that the loss of Indonesia “would make a [US] victory in Vietnam of little meaning.”[22]

Deputy Chief of Mission of the American Embassy, Francis J. Galbraith, also emphasized the importance of such program. To halt the Indo-communist virus infecting other Afro-Asian countries, in his telegram to the Department of State in June 1965, he recommended the US[23] government to launch a discreet counter-propaganda and actions against Sukarno.

Five months before the Gestapu broke out, in his report to President Johnson in April 1965, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker wrote that the succession fight had started in Indonesia.[24] US government recognized that this crucial development was taking place amid a sharply accelerated growth of the PKI’s role in government and that this trend would continue as long as Sukarno remained in control.

On the same tone with the Kent’s analysis mentioned previously, a National Intelligence assessment came up three months later projected that the non-communist elements within the Indonesian Army would end up as a winner. However, it also foresaw that the Communist elements would still play an important role. The report concluded:

“If Sukarno dies or become incapacitated in the next year or so, the immediate successor government would probably be an ostensibly non-Communist coalition. The military would almost certainly exercise greater authority than at present, but would be unlikely to risk civil war to initiate a roll back of the Communists. Indeed, the Communists are already so entrenched that they could probably not be denied an important share in any successor government.”[25]

To be noted, this estimate was prepared by the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Department of Defense, and the National Security Agency; and was approved by the members of the US Intelligence Board.

In this regard, one could reasonably imply that CIA and other US intelligence bodies had a clear interest to secure the window of opportunity that had been opened to “free” Indonesia and to eliminate the chance of the continuing influence of the PKI elements in the post-Sukarno regime.

Four weeks before the September 30 Affairs taking place, another intelligence report bolstered such speculation. The Special National Intelligence Estimate even saw that the fall of Indonesia into the Communist world was a clear and present danger. The report wrote:

“If Sukarno lives, it is possible that in two or three years the Indonesian state will be sufficiently controlled by the Communists to be termed a Communist state, even though Sukarno remains the acknowledged leader... Sukarno’s Indonesia already acts in important respects like a Communist state and is more openly hostile to the US than most Communist nations.”[26]

Nonetheless, digging the FRUS documents and other archives, I found no solid evidence to establish a direct link between those operations with the September coup attempt and to unveil the CIA’s role in plotting it. Instead, many of those revealed the US government’s consistent denials on this issue. For instance, in his telegram dated March 16, 1965, Ambassador Howard Jones wrote that he had told President Sukarno and First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio that “he had received assurances from the ‘CIA Head for the Far East’ that there were no anti-Sukarno and anti-Indonesia subversive operations.”[27]

The next denial is revealed by a telephone conversation record between acting Secretary of State Ball and Deputy Director of CIA Richard Helms on October 1, 1965, at 11:35 a.m.; one day after the September movement started. As recorded in this document, Ball questioned Helms “if we were in a position where we can categorically deny this involvement of CIA operations in the Indonesia situation.” Helms firmly answered that his agency “had had absolutely nothing to do with it. [1 line of source text not declassified].”[28]

Ambassador Jones’ letter to Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs William Bundy unveils an interesting fact. Written on April 23, 1965, he reported that he was “privy to plans for a coup here [Indonesia]” approximately in late May or June when Sukarno was out of the country. In order to play safe, he told his contact that “the US Government can in no way participate in any effort of this kind.” Jones admitted that he “conveyed clearly [his] own sympathy with his objectives.”[29] However, in his next cable sent on month later, on May 25, 1965, Jones reported that the coup plans would not happen.[30]

Later, at a historical conference discussing Indonesia at Annapolis in 1995, President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy revealed a discussion between acting Secretary of State George W. Ball and a CIA’s representative. Responding to Ball’s question whether the Agency could use its resources to reverse the leftist-trend in Indonesia, as Bundy recalled, the CIA official answered that his agency did not have an adequate assets in Indonesia to produce such impact.[31]

One of the obvious means employed by the US government to hamper the Indonesian Communist was its foreign aid. Washington gradually cut off the economic and military aid to Indonesia between 1962 and 1965. As a reaction to Sukarno’s confrontation policy toward Malaysia, Washington even took a dramatic step by reducing 80 percent of the planned assistance to Indonesia for Fiscal Year 1964.[32] The following table summarized that action:[33]

	1963	Requested for 1964	Present 1964
AID-technical assistance to civil groups, police and officers engaged in civic action, and malaria eradication	$19.6	$29.4	$12.9
MAP-weapons, communications, training	$16.6	$16.4	$2.1
Loan support for stabilization	$17.0	$40.0	0.0
TOTAL	$53.2	$85.8	$15.0

* in million

Easy to predict this move had successfully exacerbated the country’s economy and created a hard pressure to Sukarno’s administration. On the other hand, the aid allocation was shifted to anti communist elements in the Indonesian Army. In the period 1962-65, the amount of US military aid was about $39.5 million, much higher than that of 1949-61 with $28.3 million in total.[34]

Beside that, the documents I examined can only unveil the CIA operation after the September coup attempt. One of them is provided by Ralph McGehee’s confession. McGehee, an ex CIA officer, admitted to have once read a top secret CIA report on the agency’s role in provoking the PKI annihilation after the September movement. One of the agency’s roles was steering public opinion against communism. McGehee explained:

“The Agency seized upon this opportunity [Suharto’s response to Gestapu] and set out to destroy the P.K.I…. [eight sentences deleted]…. Media fabrications played a key role in stirring up popular resentment against the P.K.I. Photographs of the bodies of the dead generals—badly decomposed—were featured in all the newspapers and on television. Stories accompanying the pictures falsely claimed that the generals had been castrated and their eyes gouged out by Communist women. This cynically manufactured campaign was designed to foment public anger against the Communists and set the stage of a massacre.”[35]

McGehee explained that this kind of media operation was typical to CIA. The agency’s operation in Chile was a comparable example. In order to create appropriate situations to convert the initial reluctance of the Chilean military leaders to topple Allende, CIA manufactured a fake document revealing a communist’s plot to murder Chilean generals. This “plot” was then discovered, blown up as big news on the front page of major newspapers, and resulted in Allende’s murder.

A telegram sent from the Department of State to the US embassy in JakartaOctober 6, 1965, the telegram elaborated a strategy to carry out “VOA and information program based on citation Indonesian sources and official statements without at this stage injecting US editorializing.” The focus of this campaign was on the material “pointing finger at PKI and playing up brutality of September 30 rebels.”[36] corroborates McGehee’s testimony. Dated on

Other than such media operation, I could not find any compelling proof to support a notion that was the CIA who directly plotted the September coup.

Moreover, during the first days after the coup occurred, it seemed that the USIndonesia. This was reflected, for instance, on the telephone conversation between acting Secretary of State George W. Ball and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara on October 1, 1965, at 9:30 a.m.—or, considering the twelve-hour differences between Washington and Jakarta, only a few minutes after the September 30 Movement was initiated. The memorandum of this discussion described how Ball merely provided his best guess that “[it] looks more and more as though this is a PKI operation but [I] could not be sure.”[37] Another indication, over three weeks after the coup attempt, the US Embassy in Indonesia even could not provide an exact chronology of this incident. In a telegram-report to the Department of State, Ambassador Marshall Green summarized the September movement under a sub-title “What Probably Happened.”[38] government reacted confusedly and did not fully comprehend what exactly happened in

Washington’s knowledge about the figure of General Suharto, the key leader in cracking down the PKI, provides another indication. Suharto was indeed “a strong military leader and apparently a firm anti-Communist” who indeed fitted to the Uncle Sam’s glove.[39] Yet, prior to the September coup, he was almost an unknown figure in Washington. Evidence showed that the CIA just started preparing an intelligence memorandum on his background on October 2, one day after the coup.[40]

Another lead, although it was obvious that the US leaders did not like Sukarno, several documents revealed that they hesitated to topple Sukarno. Washington realized that its closest ally, the Army, heavily relied on Sukarno figure to gain a wide public support and to balance the PKI’s growing influence. In his assessment, Ambassador Green wrote, “…despite his faults, he [Sukarno] is Indonesia and national unity depends on allegiance to his father figure, but the army, for its part, finds its public support of Sukarno a useful symbol that it is the protector of national unity.”[41]

Based on this consideration, Washington always tried hard to maintain a good relationship with Sukarno. Like his predecessor, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker in April 1965 recommended to President Johnson that the US government “should, to extent possible, continue the effort to work with Sukarno and maintain a dialogue between him and the President.”[42] Within this perspective, should also be understood why in December 1964, in regard of Sukarno’s illness, Under Secretary of State George Ball directed Ambassador Jones to convey President Johnson’s offer to help by sending US specialists to Indonesia to provide appropriate medical assistance for Sukarno.[43]

Instead of revealing a proof of the CIA’s plot on the September coup, other declassified documents pointed the finger to other directions. One of them accused Beijing standing behind this abortive coup. The Red Chinese involvement was including “at least to extent of supplying several thousand guns which smuggled into Indonesia and distributed to Communist RBP [Pemuda Rakjat, Communist Youth Organization]” and “[t]here circumstantial evidence that Peking aware of or perhaps even had hand in plot but this not established.”[44] Ambassador Green even called the September movement as an Indonesia’s own “peculiar form of military coup.”[45]

Washington’s Hands in the Massacre

Another center of the debate surrounding the Gestapu is whether the United StatesUS regards itself as a human rights vanguard, this question is indeed significant. The number of the victims of this bloody incident was enormous. Its death scale pushed a famous philosopher Bertrand Russell wrote, “…in four months, five times as many people died in Indonesia as in Vietnam in twelve years.” One of the CIA studies even called the killings as “one of the worst mass murders of the twentieth century.”[46] According to Richard Cabot Howland, a Foreign Service officer at the Embassy in Indonesia in 1965 and 1966, approximately 350,000 to 1.5 million PKI members were murdered in the aftermath of the September movement. He obtained this figure from a Lieutenant Colonel in the Army’s Supreme Operation Command’s “Social Action Affair Section” who claimed this as an accurate field report. Howland wrote, “The totals were 50,000 dead on Java; 6,000 dead on Bali; 3,000 in North Sumatra. I was skeptical of his methods but accepted his estimates faux de mieux, and combining them with my own data produces a figure of 105,000 communists dead.”[47] played a significant role in one of the most brutal massacres of the century, by providing lists of PKI members to the Indonesian Army that then haunted and killed them. In today’s context where the

The FRUS documents clearly revealed a fact that the US government provided its hands to the Indonesian Army to haunt and slaughter the Communists. This assistance took many forms. One of those was by providing a list of PKI leaders and members. Many sources have corroborated this role.

In his letter to the Washington Post, on May 21, 1990, Robert J. Martens, an expert in international communism in the US embassy’s political section at Jakarta, confirmed that he “passed names of the PKI leaders and senior cadre system to non-Communist forces during the six months of chaos between the so-called coup and the ultimate downfall of Sukarno.” Yet, Martens emphasized that the lists he gave “were based entirely—I repeat entirely—on the Indonesia Communist press and were available to everyone.”[48] He also stated that his step was undertaken without any order or consent of the superior official of the embassy.

Interestingly, this contradicts several interviews with the embassy top officials at that time. In an interview on May 14, 1990, with Kathy Kadane, a reporter working for the States News Service, the former deputy chief of mission Jack Lydman answered “absolutely” when Kadane asked whether he or other high-level officials in the embassy approved Marten’s list to be distributed.[49] This fact is also confirmed by the airgram A-74 sent by Ambassador Green to the State Department on August 10, 1966, which clearly stated that:

“A sanitized [i.e. Embassy attribution removed] version of the lists in A-398 has been made available to the Indonesian Government last December [1965] and is apparently being used by Indonesian security authorities who seem to lack even the simplest overt information on PKI leadership at the time (lists of other officials in the PKI-affiliates, Partindo and Baperki were also provided to GOI officials at their request).”[50]

A bulk of FRUS documents provides another confirmation. Between December 1965 and August 1966 the US Embassy at Jakarta sent the State Department three airgrams consisting two lists of PKI leaders and members. The first was an unclassified list of 67 leaders of PKI’s Politbiro, Central Committee, Central Control Commission, Central Verification Commission, and Secretariat Control Committee as of May 1965. The second one was a fragmentary compilation about the present location of the PKI leaders existence.[51]

Washington also provided various military aids. Yet, to avoid the requirement of resuming the military assistance program in a government-to-government level—which could be interpreted as an official US support to Sukarno who then remained as head of state and government of Indonesia—and to minimize the risk of public exposure, this operation was channeled covertly through a third country, mainly Thailand. Another reason, this covert operation was needed since at that time the Indonesian government could not legally purchase nor obtain any US military equipment. Due to its hostility policy to the US interests, Congress had frozen the military assistance program (MAP) to Indonesia.

The assistance provided including tactical communication equipments, small arms of non-US origin, medical supplies, other logistical supports such as rice, and even money. In his telegram sent to the Department of State, Ambassador Green confirmed “we provide Malik with fifty million rupiahs requested by him for the activities of the Kap-Gestapu movement [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].”[52] Kap-Gestapu was a civilian group linked to the Army that launched massive raids to PKI members, particularly in Central Java. Adam Malik was one of the key civilian leaders and promoters of the movement.

In regard the communication equipments, the objective of providing them was clearly stated “to provide a continuity of communications among the various Army units and their anti-Communist leaders and between certain of these leaders and US elements.”[53] This may provide a compelling foundation to a speculation that by providing such means US also greatly benefited by gaining access to the vital Army internal communication, particularly in intercepting their moves to haunt the Communists. And, one therefore can fairly concludes that Washington knew every detail of the atrocities and yet let those happened in front of their eyes.

Not only providing the list and other forms of assistance, evidence also showed that Washington was fully aware of the massacre and instead of preventing or protesting it, Uncle Sam closed his eyes to this brutal men-hunt game. A telegram sent to the State Department revealed that in mid November 1965 two officers of Pemuda Pancasila, an anti-communist youth organization, visited the US Consulate office in Medan and blatantly told the consulate officers that “they intends to kill every PKI member they can catch... that Pemuda Pan[c]asila will not hand over captured PKI to authorities until they are dead or near death.”[54] Worth to be noted, firstly set up in 1959, Pemuda Pancasila later became a notorious paramilitary organization of petty criminals who undertaking strong-arm jobs in supporting Suharto’s dictatorship.

As well, the Medan Consulate was not unaware of the potential atrocity and of the fact that the murder also included many common people. In the same telegram, Consul Theodore Heavner inserted his comments as follow:

“Attitude of Pemuda Pan[c]asila leaders can only be described as bloodthirsty. While reports of wholesale killings may be greatly exaggerated, number and frequency such reports plus attitude of youth leaders suggests that something like real reign of terror against PKI is taking place. This terror is not discriminating very carefully between PKI leaders and ordinary PKI members with no ideological bond to the party.”[55]

Was the list a determinant factor causing the killing? Historians are still on dispute in determining how significant the US lists’ role in aiding the massacre in the aftermath of the September movement. Here, I would argue that the more significant impetus of the killings rooted on a long conflict between the Communist and Muslims in the grass-root level.

Hefner’s classical study on a peasant-society of Mountain Java in rural Pasuruan, Eastern Java, showed that the bloodshed of 1965 was deeply rooted on a latent political-class-religious rivalry between the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and a traditionalist-Islamic organization, the Nahdlatul Ulama (Ulamas Association, NU).[56] In this area, a long-standing cleavage occurred between the two polarized societies living in two different areas. They who lived in the upland area were predominantly non-Muslim, Hindus-Javanist, and affiliated to the Indonesian National Party (PNI) and the PKI. On the other side, they who inhabited in the lowland were traditionalist Muslims and members of the NU Party.[57]

In these circumstances, fierce competitions between the two subsets of society to gain controls over the political, religious and means of production were inevitable. The tension mounted in late 1963, less than two years before the Gestapu broke out, when PKI called for a land reform as a part of their strategy to expand their political basis in the rural areas. Muslim party leaders who owned the vast farming lands perceived this move as an assault to their political-religious-economic interests. And many studies noted that East Java was the site where the most violent anti-communists hunting took place in the aftermath of the coup attempt of 1965.

Muslims’ Jihad Against the Communist

Examining the FRUS documents focusing on the September movement, from October 1965 to March 1966, it is obvious that the US government did not consider Islamic movements as key players.

The American foreign policy was not yet in a direction toward the US-Mujahedin relationship in Afghanistan during 1970-80s. Authorized by President Carter in December 1979 and then by President Reagan in 1981, CIA launched a covert operation to send weapons to the Mujahedin in order to increase the cost of Soviet intervention and to block the communism expansion in this region.[58]

Of the sixty-four FRUS documents examined, none a single significant part were devoted to elaborate a pivotal role of Islamic movement activists in cracking and hunting down the PKI members. All analyses almost neglected Muslims and put them as no more than a category of communist hunter in the aftermath of the Gestapu. For example, in a telegram from the US Consulate in Medan to the Department of State, on November 16, 1965, it is only written, “Consulate sources have connected some of this violence with declaration ‘holy war’ against PKI by local Moslem leaders.”[59] Adding to this, Hefner also noted that another major Islamic organization, Muhammadiyah, also issued a fatwa, a legal pronouncement in Islam, saying that the destruction of the communist was a religious obligation.[60] To put it quantitatively, in all these documents with hundreds pages long, the word “Moslem” appeared only twelve times and “Islam” was even completely absent.

Those documents even barely elaborate the role of Islamic parties and institutions. Only once the telegram from the US Embassy explicitly identified two major Islamic organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. This is interesting to underline considering that in the Indonesia-FRUS documents regarding the preceding period, the key role of Islamic institution in fighting communism was recognized, even very modestly. A secret intelligence memorandum dated on December 3, 1964 recognized NU’s standing in opposing communism. This document recorded the discussion between Adam Malik and Ambassador Jones. Malik was the Indonesian Minister of Trade and a pivotal figure that spurred the anti Communist movement. He told Jones that his maneuver “has the support of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)” and that an NU official had requested Sukarno to “endorse non communist ideas” and that NU was “fully backing the new force.” [61]

The US’ lack of concern on the Muslim’s pivotal role occurred even though one of the US Medan-Consulate telegrams had recorded an analysis of their sources indicating that the communists massacred was related to a holy war waged by local Muslim leaders.[62] Not only that, an intelligence memorandum written three weeks after of the September movement identified that “some army officer’s belief are firmly rooted in a fundamentalist and essentially anti-Communist Moslem tradition.”[63]

More interestingly, at least twelve years earlier the US government has recognized the potential role of Muslims in halting the spread of communism in Indonesia. Scott noted that in the mid-1950s the CIA channeled millions of dollars to the right-wing political parties, particularly to the Masjumi Party, or the Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims Party.[64]

NU was the only major Islamic party in Indonesia after Sukarno disbanded Masjumi Party over an allegation of its involvement in prior separatist armed movements. NU and Muhammadiyah had each million members across the country. In the first national parliamentary election of 1955, NU, functioning as a political party, was the third winner.[65] Another Islamic party, Masjumi, was on the second rank. Masjumi obtained over 7.9 million votes or 20.9 percent of the total votes, and almost 7 million voters or 18.4 percent supported NU. On the top was the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) with 8.4 million votes (22.3 percent), whereas the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was on the fourth with about 6.2 million votes (16.4 percent). These four parties’ votes consisted 77.7 percent of the total votes.[66]

Muslims’ opposition to communism had even been flagged far long before. Masjumi, another Islamic party, denounced communists as kafir (infidel). They openly attacked the anti-religious nature of communism by using Chou En-lai’s speech at the 1955 Bandung Asian-African Conference stating, “We Communists are atheists.”[67]

US Support on Suharto’s Militaristic Regime

The next puzzle pertains to the US government endorsement on the establishment of Suharto’s military dictatorship in replacing Sukarno’s leftist administration.[68] Evidence showed that Washington deliberately made this choice in order to serve its best interest during the Cold War. In his memorandum, the Acting Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, David L. McDonald, explicitly wrote that “[t]he displacement of President Sukarno by the Indonesian Army could benefit US security interests in the area.”[69] In Uncle Sam’s eyes Suharto was “a strong military leader and apparently a firm anti-Communist” who nicely fitted onto his glove.[70]

US’s favor on the Indonesian Army was developed under some reasons. The first explanation is, as elaborated before, the firm anti-communist standing of its top leaders. The army leaders had a long record in opposing the PKI. In addition, some army leaders undoubtedly viewed Communism as an ideology that was essentially evil and alien to the “Indonesian way of life.”

The second reason is more important. After PKI was cornered, the Army emerged as the most plausible option for the US interests. As depicted by Ambassador Green, after the September coup there were only two power centers in the Indonesian political stage: Sukarno and the Army.[71] Washington believed that “there was no organized or disciplined force capable of providing leadership and direction to successor government, except Army.”[72] Such belief had been long established. Years ago US leaders had saw that they needed to tie a close relation with the Army leaders under a projection that “they may well played a major role in the decision as to the future political orientation of the country.”[73]

Moreover, Washington even forecasted a chaotic scenario in Indonesia in the absence of Army leadership. In his telegram, State Secretary Dean Rusk wrote, “Unless Army accepts the responsibility for taking lead in new government, however unready or unwilling it may be, there will be anarchy in government... Indonesia can be saved from chaos, and that Army is main instrument for saving it.”[74] For Washington, in fact, more than as a savior, the Army was a determinant factor to shifting away Indonesian foreign policy’s direction from Beijing and Moscow.

However, the FRUS and other documents also revealed that this support was given not without reservation. The US government did aware of the negative aspect of the new Indonesian military-heavy government. Washington had already foreseen the prevalence of the future authoritarian Indonesian government. Sent to President Johnson in August 1966, a secret analysis of the State Department conceded that this new militaristic regime was a potential threat to Indonesian democracy in the future considering the military had “no major commitment to democratic freedoms as we know them” and “[t]here is a danger that the Army may in the course of time move in the pattern of Burma to a military authoritarian state.”[75] As proven later, this was an apt forecast of the future Indonesia under Suharto’s 32-year dictatorship.

Washington was also aware that despite its strong anti-Communist orientation, the Indonesian Army is far from being a capitalist-defender. The Army opposed western military presence in Southeast Asia and US policy in Vietnam. Its economic orientation was very nationalistic and supported any notion to nationalize western business entities. Moreover, due to its dependency to the Soviet military spare parts, replacements and ammunitions, it was more likely that the Army leaders would maintain a good relationship with Moscow.[76] An intelligence report also revealed that to sooth Sukarno, Indonesian Minister of Defense Nasution had “promised that Indonesia would adopt neither a policy of hostility to Communism as an ideology at home nor to the Soviet Union and its satellites in international affairs.”[77] The report also described the Soviet Union, in order to maintain a close government-to-government relations, took a quiet position in reacting on the Communists killings in Indonesia in which this was very contrast compared to Moscow’s standing on a similar situation at Iraq in 1963.

Clearly, Washington then defined its foreign policy toward Indonesia under a pragmatic consideration. The paper concluded, “For the time being and for the foreseeable future there is no conceivable political alternative to an Army-dominated government[.]”[78] Haunted by the domino theory, the US government ironically chose a blatant paradox: supporting a militaristic regime to safeguard the Free Indonesia.

Conclusions

When the dust settled, a clear picture emerged: The 1965 abortive coup led to one of the US’ glorious victories in the Cold War battlefield. Short after the September movement, the leftist Indonesian foreign policy was successfully neutralized. “Indonesia’s close alignment with Communist China is shattered… Indos are starting to do normal business with us again,” Ambassador Green reported happily in December 1965.

Only three months after the abortive coup took place, the Embassy received payment for damage to Medan and Surabaya Consulates attacked previously by mobs. USIS books kept in storage since March were handed over back to the Indonesian Ministry of Higher Education to be distributed to Indonesian universities.[79]

Not merely acting as a neutralist country as previously predicted, Suharto’s IndonesiaChina in what so called the triangle-diplomacy game, Indonesia provided its crucial vote in the United Nations to support the United States’ important question resolution to expel Taiwan.[80] also converted to be an American reliable ally in the international phora. When Uncle Sam was struggling to embrace

Sukarnos’ axis with Beijing was ended and the idea of NEFOS (New Emerging Forces) was suddenly scrapped. The change in Indonesia’s leftist policies was a significant break in the Southeast Asia “and a vivid example to many other nations of nationalist forces rising to beat back a Communist threat.”[81] And the “American dream” became a reality as Ambassador Green reported on March 12, 1966, “PKI and all its front organizations were formally banned by Suharto at noon today.”[82]

Apparently, the American government took advantages of the 1965 September momentum. Yet, this paper found no evidence that it played an active role, such as instigating the coup attempt. CIA’s involvement was rather indirect and took a form of ex post factoplaying up the brutality of September 30 rebels. The conversation records during the first days after the September coup also indicated that the US leaders reacted confusedly and did not fully understand what was happening in Jakarta. Other documents even accused Beijing and Sukarno’s role in backing up the Gestapu. operation. Evidence showed that such operation was undertaken by steering public opinion against communism. The focus of this campaign was on materials pointing finger at PKI and

Another US obvious role was providing the lists of PKI leaders and members to the Army that utilized those in haunting and killing them. Yet, the list was not a determinant factor leading to the massacre in the aftermath of the September movement. As shown by Robert Hefner’s study in a peasant society in Mountain Java, the long socio-economic-political conflict between the Communist and Muslims in the grass-root level contributed a more significant role to the atrocities.

In battling Indonesian communist, Washington did not take the Muslim movement into account and rather relied on the Indonesian army. Examining the FRUS documents focusing on the September movement, from October 1965 to March 1966, there is no single chapter or even a paragraph were devoted to elaborate a pivotal role of Islamic movement activists in hunting down the PKI members. The lack of concern on the Muslim’s pivotal role occurred even though one of the US Consulate telegrams had indicated that the Communists massacre was related to a holy war waged by the local Muslim leaders. This was indeed a contrast with the post 9/11 policies in which the Indonesian Muslims are perceived as an important target of the US public diplomacy and counter-terrorism measures.

In that period, eliminating the Communist influence is the top priority of the US foreign policy toward Indonesia. In achieving this prime objective, the later US foreign policy’s emphasis on the principles of democracy and human rights was compromised. Washington then relied on the Army to establish a new military-heavy government. However, the US government was already aware of the danger of the future Indonesian authoritarian government, that the new military regime was a potential threat to Indonesian democracy in the future. Proven later, this was an apt forecast of the Indonesian future under Suharto’s 32-year dictatorial regime.

* * *

References

Cavanagh, Terry. “Lessons of the 1965 Indonesian Coup.” World Socialist Website (1995). http://www.wsws.org/exhibits/1965coup/coup-1.htm (accessed March 15, 2006).

“CIA Stalling State Department Histories.” The National Security Archives, (July 27, 2001). http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB52/ (accessed March 3, 2006).

Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. London, England: Penguin Books, 2005.

Feith, Herbert. The Indonesian Elections of 1955. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 1971.

Head, Mike. “US Orchestrated Suharto’s 1965-66 Slaughter in Indonesia.” World Socialist Website (July 9, 1999). http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/jul1999/indo2-j20.shtml (accessed March 5, 2006).

Hefner, Robert W. The political economy of Mountain Java: an interpretative history. Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990.

Herring, George C. America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975. 4^th ed. New York: McGraw Hill, 2002.

Howland, Richard Cabot, “The Lessons of the September 30 Affair.” Studies in Intelligence 14 (Fall 1970): 13-28.

Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines. Foreign Relations of the United States Series, 1964-68, XXVI (1998), 1 – 576.

Jensen, K.M. Origins of the Cold War: The Novikov, Kennan, and Roberts ‘long telegrams’ of 1946, revised ed. Washington, D.C.: United State Institute of Peace Press, 1993.

Kadane, Kathy. “Ex-agents Say CIA Compiled Deaths Lists for Indonesians: After 25 Years, Americans Speak of Their Role in Exterminating Communist Party.” States News Service, 1990. http://www.namebase.org/kadane.html (accessed March 10, 2006).

Kadane, Kathy. “Marshall Green: ‘When We Were in Indonesia We Were Very Careful Not To Be Saying This Kind of Thing,’” n.d. http://www.antenna.nl/wvi/eng/ic/pki/kadane/kadane.html (accessed March 10, 2006).

NSC (US National Security Council). United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Southeast Asia. In: The Pentagon Papers (Gravel ed.), 1(20), January 16, 1954, 434-443.

Palmier, Leslie. Communists in Indonesia: Power Pursued in Vain. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1973.

Scott, Peter Dale. “The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-1967.” Pacific Affairs 58, Summer 1985, 239-264.

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[1] Memorandum for President Johnson, (Washington, October 1, 1965, 7:20 a.m.).

[2] Intelligence Memorandum: The Upheaval in Indonesia, PCI No. 2330/65, (Washington, October 6, 1965).

[3] “CIA Stalling State Department Histories,” The National Security Archives, (July 27, 2001), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB52/ (accessed March 3, 2006).

[4] Howland.

[5] Peter Dale Scott, “The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-1967,” Pacific Affairs 58 (Summer 1985), 239.

[6] George C. Herring. America’s longest war: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 4^th ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 2002), 42.

[7] Richard Cabot Howland, “The Lessons of the September 30 Affair.” Studies in Intelligence 14 (Fall 1970): 13. Nevertheless, as proven later, the domino theory was invalid. In responding to President Johnson’s asking to examine the correlation between the post-Gestapu situation in Indonesia and the US policy on Vietnam, Deputy Director of CIA Richard Helms stated, “[W]e have searched in vain for evidence that the US display of determination in Vietnam directly influenced the outcome of the Indonesian crisis in any significant way’ and that the September coup “appears to have evolved purely from a complex and long-standing domestic political situation.” This is revealed from the Intelligence Memorandum, OCI No. 0815/66, (May 13, 1966) drawn from Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Indonesia, Vol. VI, 11/65-5/66.

[8] Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, 868. Ref: Embtel 852, 1435Z, (Jakarta, October 5, 1965).

[9] Special National Intelligence Estimate.

[10] Special National Intelligence Estimate.

[11] US National Security Council. United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Southeast Asia, NSC 5405, (January 16, 1954).

[12] Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson, (Washington, August 30, 1964).

[13] Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, 2641, 0825Z, (Jakarta, June 5, 1965).

[14] Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 55-65, (Washington, September 1, 1965).

[15] Leslie Palmier, Communists in Indonesia: Power Pursued in Vain (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1973).

[16] See Memorandum of Conversation, SecDel/MC/50, (New York, December 11, 1964, 10 a.m.), Memorandum from Director of the Unites States Information Agency Rowan to Secretary of State Rusk, (Washington, February 18, 1965), and Memorandum from the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson, (Washington, March 18, 1965).

[17] Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia, (Washington, February 20, 1965, 12:39 p.m.).

[18] Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia, 435, (Washington, September 10, 1965, 8:08 p.m.); and Memorandum from James C. Thomson, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson, (Washington, September 14, 1965, 8:30 p.m.).

[19] Memorandum from the Director, Far East Region (Blouin) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton), I-25070/65, (Washington, August 3, 1965); and Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Barber) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (McNaughton), I-25237/65, (Washington, August 11, 1965). In his assessment regarding this development, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Arthur W. Barber analyzed that Indonesia had not capability yet to develop an atomic bomb by its own resources. The most plausible possibility was “a test of a ChiCom bomb in China, with “Indonesian participation … but we are doubtful it will be done.”

[20] Special Memorandum Prepared by the Director of the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency (Kent), No. 4-65, (Washington, January 26, 1965).

[21] Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee, (Washington, February 23, 1965). The phrase “another US government agency” refers to a line of source text on the document that is not declassified.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, 2641, 0825Z, (Djakarta, June 5, 1965). Galbraith used the phrase “against Sukarno’s policies … of Nasakomizing Afro-Asian World. Nasakom is a Sukarno’s concept of joining the power of three different ideologies; nasionalism, religion, and communism.

[24] Report from Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker to President Johnson, (Washington, April 26, 1965).

[25] National Intelligence Memorandum, NIE 54/55-65, (Washington, July 1, 1965).

[26] Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 55-65, (Washington, September 1, 1965).

[27] Footnote in Memorandum from Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), (Washington, March 13, 1965).

[28] Ball Papers, Telephone Conversation, Indonesia [4/12/64-11/10/65]. Lyndon Johnson Library. In FRUS 1964-68: Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, XXVI, (1998) 301.

[29] “Editorial Note,” in Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. XXVI, (1998), 254.

[30] Ibid.

[31] “Editorial Note,” in Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. XXVI, (1998), 288.

[32] Memorandum Prepared by the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy): Memorandum on Indonesia, (Washington, January 7, 1964).

[33] Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson, (Washington, January 6, 1964).

[34] Scott.

[35] Ralph McGehee, “The CIA and the White Paper on El Salvador,” in Peter Dale Scott, “The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-1967,” Pacific Affairs 58 (Summer 1985): 239-264. The deleted word reflects censorship by CIA

[36] Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia, 400. Ref Embtel 868, Washington, October 6, 1965, 7:39 p.m.

[37] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Acting Secretary of State Ball and Secretary of Defense McNamara, (Washington, October 1, 1965, 9:30 a.m).

[38] Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, (Jakarta, October 26, 1965).

[39] Intelligence Memorandum: The Upheaval in Indonesia, OCI No. 2330/65, (October 6, 1965).

[40] Memos, 10/65-11/65, Indonesia, Vol. V, (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File).

[41] Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, (Jakarta, October 14, 1965).

[42] Report from Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker to President Johnson, (Washington, April 26, 1965).

[43] Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia, (Washington, December 18, 1964, 8:18 p.m.).

[44] Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson, (October 25, 1965, 11:30 a.m).

[45] Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, 1000Z, (Jakarta, March 12, 1966).

[46] Peter Dale Scott, “The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-1967,” Pacific Affairs 58 (Summer 1985): 239.

[47] Howland, 23.

[48] “Editorial Note,” in Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. XXVI, (1998), 185-186.

[49] Kathy Kadane, “Marshall Green: ‘When We Were in Indonesia We Were Very Careful Not To Be Saying This Kind of Thing,’” n.d, http://www.antenna.nl/wvi/eng/ic/pki/kadane/kadane.html.

[50] “Editorial Note,” in Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, FRUS 1964-68, 186.

[51] Editorial Note in Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. XXVI, (1998), 386-387.

[52] Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, (Jakarta, December 2, 1965).

[53] Memorandum prepared for the 303 Committee, (Washington, November 17, 1965).

[54] Telegram from the Consulate in Medan to the Department of State, 0115Z (Medan, Indonesia, November 16, 1965).

[55] Ibid.

[56] Robert W. Hefner, The Political Economy of Mountain Java: An Interpretative History (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990).

[57] At that time, NU was also a religious institutions and as well a political party.

[58] Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, (London, England: Penguin Books, 2005).

[59] Telegram from the Consulate in Medan to the Department of State, 0115Z, (Medan, Indonesia, November 16, 1965).

[60] Hefner.

[61] Intelligence Memorandum, OCI No. 2057/64, (December 2, 1964).

[62] Telegram from the Consulate in Medan to Department of State, 0115Z, (November 16, 1965).

[63] Intelligence Memorandum, OCI No. 2943/65, (Washington, November 22, 1965).

[64] Scott.

[65] After the first 1955 general elections, the second one was held in 1971 under Suharto’s regime.

[66] Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 1971).

[67] Ibid.

[68] For this sort of allegation, see for instance: Mike Head, “US Orchestrated Suharto’s 1965-66 Slaughter in Indonesia,” World Socialist Website (July 9, 1999), http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/jul1999/indo2-j20.shtml.

[69] Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara, JCSM-909-65, (Washington, December 30, 1965).

[70] Intelligence Memorandum: The Upheaval in Indonesia, OCI No. 2330/65, (October 6, 1965).

[71] Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, 0030Z, (Jakarta, October 17, 1965).

[72] Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia, (Washington, October 25, 1965, 3:48 p.m.).

[73] Bromley Smith, Memorandum of Conversation, (Washington, January 22, 1965, 10 a.m.-12:40 p.m.).

[74] Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia, (Washington, October 25, 1965b, 3:48 p.m.).

[75] Enclosure of memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson, (Washington, August 1, 1966).

[76] Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs (Cuthell) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy), (Washington, November 3, 1965).

[77] Intelligence Memorandum: Indonesian Army Attitudes toward Communism, OCI No. 2943/65, (Washington, November 22, 1965).

[78] Ibid.

[79] Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, 1250Z, (Jakarta, December 22, 1965).

[80] Conversation between President Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger and Between President Nixon and Secretary of State William Rogers, Respectively, (17 October 1971). [National Archive, Nixon White House Tapes, Conversations 11-102 and 11-105].

[81] Attachment on the Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, (Washington, June 8, 1966, 2:35 p.m.).

[82] Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, 1000Z, (Jakarta, March 12, 1966).